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Author’s Note 
The booklet draws from my German book on Civilization 
(translated Civilization. State und Man, Violence and Law, 
Culture and Nature, 2009, pp. 473, Open Access, Free 
University of Berlin), from lectures on sentencing and 
Philosophy of Criminal Law, given as a member of the Law 
Faculty of the Free University of Berlin, and especially from 
a concept prepared for a research visit to the Hastings 
College of Law, San Francisco in 2009, in light of a new 
agreement on exchange of students and scholars between 
both faculties.  
Thanks to Boris Karasch for correcting my rusty English, 
and thanks to my little team, Dr. iur. Henning Loeck, Dr. iur. 
Daniel Schubert, Diana Champarova, and last not least to 
Natalie Korth-Ndiaye.  
 
Axel Montenbruck, Berlin, February 2010 
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Second Edition 
This is a slightly revised second edition; I have been able to 
publish it quickly thanks to the Open Access publishing 
made available by the FU Berlin.  
In particular, I have benefited from a long conversation with 
Professor of Law and Philosophy James Nickel (MiamiU). 
In response to this talk, I have added discussions of 
syncretism, Searle’s philosophy of speech acts and 
Tomasello’s anthropology of communication.  
I also profited from hearing a speech by Professor David 
Abraham (MiamiU) as Bosch Public Policy Fellow at “The 
American Academy in Berlin”, Mai 2010. The speech was 
about “Immigration and Social Solidarity,” and it indicated 
to me both again the growing importance of the aspect of 
“we”, as in “We, the people…”, and the fertility of 
comparing Western cultures. But of course, social solidarity 
is only the public kind of solidarity; private charity is 
another. In times of peace solidarity is only the third ranking 
part of the Western Trinity of “Liberty, Equity and 
Solidarity”. But in light of social psychology human beings 
are social animals, too. Within a person, culture and nature 
cannot work without each other. 
Visiting FU Berlin Department of Law in Mai 2010, 
Professor Darien Shanske (Hastings College of Law, UC), 
did not mind reading and discussing critically some of the 
newly written pieces. 
Related to this booklet, since the first edition I have 
published a small trilogy of books, sadly in German. They 
are called “Civil-Religion”, and published by Open Access, 
FU Berlin, too. The English version of the titles might 
outline both their substance, and the background of the 
booklet. 
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- Civil-Religion I – Basics: Western Preamble-
Humanism, and universal Trinity of Nature, Soul, and 
Mind, 2010, pp. 135. 
- Civil-Religion II – Elements: Reconciliation and 
Mediation, Punishment and Confession, Justice and 
Humanity, 2010, pp. 314. 
- Civil-Religion III – Superstructure: Democratic 
Humanism, realistic Dehumanization, synthetical 
Pragmatism of a “Middle-World”, 2010, pp. 261.  
And again, without support of Dr. iur. Henning Loeck, Dr. 
iur. Daniel Schubert, Diana Champarova, and last not least 
to Natalie Korth-Ndiaye there would not be any publishable 
material. 
 
Axel Montenbruck, Berlin, June 2010 
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Abstract 
The special kind of freedom of homo sapiens includes both, 
abiding by – normative – ethics of Humanity and contrasting 
ethics by using the – empirical – ability to dehumanize 
others. We humans are able to switch rather easily between 
both. The grammar of our Western languages indicates that, 
and Western political philosophy defines dignity of man by a 
similar formula.  
Regarding punishment and crime, our psyche is working 
with techniques of neutralizing brutal acts. Even we “good 
ones” suppress acting inhumanely towards others by the 
method of neutralizing or better by collectivizing ourselves. 
We democrats submit blindly to the Rule of Law and the 
mightiness of our own Justice. Justifying easily lifelong 
incarceration without accepting a bit of personal 
responsibility for our own decisions is a kind of a collective 
ritual of de-individuation, sovereign democrats should be 
aware of.  
In order to define humanity as well as its negation, 
inhumanity, the simple Democratic Trinity of “Freedom, 
Equity and Solidarity” is to be picked up. 
With a set of four theses I’ll try reducing the complexity:  
(1) Jurisprudence and Political Science: There might be 
“Three Democratic Steps of Punishment”.  
(2) Linguistics and Culture: Grammar of Western languages 
indicate we are prepared for both Democracy in a We-group 
and for its Negation. Therefore Freedom might be defined as 
“status communicativus”, too.  
(3) Psychology and Ethics: Milgram et al. prove that the 
majority of us cannot avoid “obedience and submission”. 
 8 
Therefore we have to develop both strong collective ethics 
and at least for leaders a “Personal Democratic Identity”.  
(4) Finally Philosophical Anthropology: The favored “Rule 
of Weighing Political Acts Democratically” means 
harmonizing for each important individual case “freedom, 
equity and solidarity”. 
 9 
I. Prologue: Ethics and Anthropology1
In March 2009, visiting Alcatraz prison and hearing 
something about the contemporary Californian kind of 
sentencing, I am now looking for a supranational Western 
“common sense” to explain punishment and crime. 
1 
I do not ask, why there should be or must be “punishment at 
all” or what “crime” means. The reality is, probably every 
society knows a story like Cain and Abel. Therefore let us 
take both statements for granted: An unjustified killing is a 
severe crime, and there would be a strong reaction to “right 
the wrong2, in any case. Without a professional and civilized 
“social reaction” justice would be left in private hands. 
Typically strong, private “protection groups” would grow up 
and exercise their kind of war lord justice. 
2 
                                           
1 See for instance: van der Burg, Wibren, Essentially Ambigious 
Concepts and the Fuller-Hart-Dworkin Debate, Archives for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (2009), p. 312 
(“Science, religion, law, morality – they all would simply not 
exist without humans and human actions.”). 
2  Dershowitz, Alan M., Rights from Wrongs – A Secular Theory 
of the Origins of Rights (2004), pp. 8. Hoffmann-Holland, 
Klaus, Ethics and Human Rights in a Globalized World. An 
interdisciplinary Approach, in: Hoffmann-Holland, Ethics and 
Human Rights in a Globalized World (2009), p. 1 (“rights come 
from wrongs”). 
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But if one insists – for instance with Boonin3 – on addressing 
the question morally, why punishment at all, and furthermore 
adds that if punishment is to be executed, all kind of reasons 
would probably influence the meaning of punishment, both 
would probably be valid. And I must answer to both:  
3 
In light of anthropology, justice seems to be at least a human 
need. There is a strong psychological inclination toward 
retaliation, fairness and compensation. Furthermore, there 
seems to exist a second inclination towards prevention, 
regarding real fear, and a third one for symbolic acts of 
restoration to cope with death, violations of collective rules 
and with frustrations. All the three strands of thought are 
well known. Altogether they illustrate punishment. But the 
core of Western punishment seems to be the first element, a 
“civilized reaction”.  
4 
This “need” is – morally – called the Golden Rule. “Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you.” It is both, the 
dynamic process reciprocity and the ideal of equity. The 
Romans say “do ut des” (I give that you give). It is “tit for 
tat” that represents Rappaport’s strategy for coping with 
Axelrod’s Prisoner’s Dilemma. Giving credit first and then 
blindly react only is probably even a part of the biological 
theory of “evolution by cooperation”.4
5 
                                           
3 In light of philosophy: Boonin, David, The Problem of 
Punishment (2008), p. 1: “This is the thesis that there is no 
solution to the problem of punishment and that it is morally 
impermissible for the state to punish people for breaking the 
law”….“we should abolish our practice of punishing 
people…”. But he recognizes that punishment is a “ubiquitous 
practice”. Strict moral questions lead to moral answers. In 
Western societies morality is important, but at least, the social 
and the psychological phenomenon are significant, too. 
4 Boyd, Robert, Mistakes Allow Evolutionary Stability in the 
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 136 (1989), pp. 47-56. As a rule of cooperation by 
subhuman primates (apes): Ridley, Matt, The Origins of Virtue: 
Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation (1996), pp. 
51 (“The Prisoner’s Dilemma”); Vogel, Gretchen, News Focus: 
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The strong feeling for fairness probably derives from 
“empathy”.5 That means putting your “individual self” in 
place of the other, an individual also.6 On the social side, the 
need “to right a wrong” must be grounded on the feeling of 
harmed identity. It is part of asking for respect for a mainly 
ethnical “We-group”, too.7 Nations call for solidarity in the 
6 
                                                                                                           
The Evolution of the Golden Rule, Science, 303 (2004), pp. 
1128. In light of law philosophy: Montenbruck, Axel, 
Vergeltung, in: Strafrechtsphilosophie. Vergeltung, Strafzeit, 
Sündenbock, Menschenrechtsstrafe (1995-2009) (2009), Rdnr. 
100. 
5 In light of liberal arts: Lampert, Khen, Traditions of 
Compassion: from Religious duty to Social Activism (2005), 
pp. 157. In light of empirical science: Decety, Jean / Jackson, 
Philip L., The functional architecture of human empathy, 
Behavioural and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews, 3 (2004), 
pp. 71-100. In light of socio-economy: Frank, Robert H., 
Passions with Reasons. The Strategy Role of the Emotion 
(1988), Chap. III; pp. 43: Theory of Moral Sentiments, pp. 54 
(“The impulse to seek revenge is likewise counter productive 
unless others have some way of anticipating that one has it. The 
person in whom this sentiment resides to deter potential 
predators…”). Insofar both communications and an impression 
of trust are important. But to be remembered is that even on the 
genetic level there exits a kind of genetic communication 
between species, which live together in special biotopes over 
hundred thousands of years (and a lot of generations).  
6  In light of political philosophy, see: Mensch, James, Political 
Violence. The Conflation of Sovereignty and Freedom, in: 
Hagedorn, Ludger / Staudigl, Michael (Hrsg.), Über 
Zivilisation und Differenz, Beiträge zu einer politischen 
Phänomenologie Europas (2008), 285 ff., 302, “We transfer to 
the other our sense of being a subject … we also transfer to our 
self the others different grasp of the situation as evident by his 
or her physical or verbal behavior” and “the space of freedom 
that their alterity affords us”… “The moral authority of such 
rules is that of the space of judicial order that embodies our 
alterity and freedom”. That means that personal individuality is 
an old logical born of personal freedom, too. 
7  Eriksen, Thomas H., Ethnic Identity, National Identity and 
Intergroup Conflict: The Significance of Personal Experiences, 
in: Ashmore / Jussim / Wilder (Eds.), Social Identity, 
Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction (2001), pp. 42-70.  
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sense of “patriotism”.8 Violating the identity of a group 
means violating the identity of every single member who 
defines himself or herself as a part of the whole, too. 
In light of philosophy Nussbaum describes the sense of 
revenge:  
7 
“The primitive sense of the just remarkably constant from 
several ancient cultures to modern institutions...starts from 
the notion that a human life...is a vulnerable thing, a thing 
that can be invaded, wounded, violated by another's act in 
many ways. For this penetration, the only remedy that seems 
appropriate is a counter invasion, equally deliberate, 
equally grave. And to right the balance truly, the retribution 
must be exactly, strictly proportional to the original 
encroachment. It differs from the original act only in the 
sequence of time and in the fact that it is response rather 
than original act—a fact frequently obscured if there is a 
long sequence of acts and counteracts”.  
The call for “angry revenge” is a well known impulsive 
human reaction. Cultivating this impulse is a part of the 
collective feeling of “sympathy” that derives from personal 
empathy. Sympathy leads to the need for healing of all the 
harmed ones. Therefore sympathy with victims of crimes 
and maybe more with their relatives must evolve to a kind of 
ritual satisfaction of all the harmed feelings. Hence a public 
process ending in “retaliation” (an Eye for an Eye) is 
grounded in sympathy and in the need of healing, too.9
8 
                                           
8  Pettit, Philip, Republicanism. A Theory of freedom and 
Government (1997), p. 257 (“civility involves identification as 
well as internationalization”, and: “patriotism as identifying in 
a good part with the society… considered as a whole”). 
Abraham, David, Constitutional Patriotism, Citizenship, and 
Belonging, 6 ICon: International Journal of Constitutional Law 
137 (2008), pp. 137. 
9  “The abiding of the Code is the talio, the term for sympathetic 
punishment in which the part of the body that committed the 
crime is mutilated or amputated. If a man put out the eye of 
 13 
But, in light of anthropology the strong impulse to react 
without rationalizing about the costs could be an advantage. 
It could be that there is a “good reason” even for the strong 
human emotion of “angry revenge”, or better, a good reason 
for the peacekeeping threat of its existence.10 At least, in a 
mechanical kind of thinking, it is the countervailing power to 
a power that yields a kind of equalization. Even in physics 
bodies are trying to maintain their existence by resisting. 
Each body that is hit or even destroyed by another body, 
more or less harms that other hitting body. So, fair retaliation 
probably stems from a universal kind of blind reaction. It is 
9 
                                                                                                           
another man, his eye shall be put out. If a man knock out the 
teeth of his equal, his teeth shall be knocked out. If he breaks 
another man’s bone, his bone shall be broken.” Lyons, Lewis, 
The history of punishment. Judicial penalties from ancient 
times to present day (2003), p. 8, p. 23. In addition it should be 
noted with Lewis (p. 25): “The earliest complete legal code in 
our possession is the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, famous 
for its reliance on sympathetic punishment ‘an eye for an eye’. 
The Code of Hammurabi was a blueprint for later legal codes, 
the Biblical laws of the Hebrews and the Islamic Laws of 
Sharia, the laws of ancient Greece and Rome, and the legal 
codes of Europe”.  
10  In light of socio-economy: Frank, Robert H., Passions with 
Reasons. The Strategy Role of the Emotion (1988), Chap. III, 
pp. 43: Theory of Moral Sentiments, pp. 54 (“The impulse to 
seek revenge is likewise counterproductive unless others have 
some way of anticipating that one has it. The person in whom 
this sentiment resides has to deter potential predators”). Insofar 
both communications and an impression of trust are important. 
But to be remembered is that even on the genetic level there 
exits a kind of genetic communication between species, which 
live together in habitats, over a lot of generations. See as well: 
Weiler, Hans N., On Love and Altruismen, Rationality and 
Society 3 (1991), pp. 197. In German: Zur politischen Idee der 
“Vernunft der Gefühle” und der Bedeutung des Nationalstolzes, 
see: Bolle, Friedel, Emotionen und Vernunft – keine 
Gegensätze. Antrittsvorlesung an der Europa-Universität 
Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) am 14. Juni 1994, in: Weiler, Hans 
N. (Hrsg.), Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) 
Universitätsschriften, Band 7: Antrittsvorlesungen I 
(Sommersemester 1994) (1995), 155 ff. 
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not the existence of that feeling but its moral quality and 
civilizing revenge that is to be considered.  
Probably within every peer group, the humane impulse for 
revenge seems being the germ for the existence of two 
ethical and reasonable twins. One is called the “avenge” as 
justice in the form of “iustitia commutativa” or as a kind of 
“equity”.11 The other twin chooses the utilitarian approach, 
which is its prevention. 
10 
Anyhow, if revenge is unavoidable, and if compensation is 
needed, then it is better done in a “civilized form”. In 
Western civilization and Western politics, a synonym for 
civilization would be the term Democracy. That should be 
simple political topic for a Western society. 
11 
However, a multidisciplinary approach combining four 
topics to a philosophical kind of “Anthropology of 
Punishment” is intended: Firstly, Democracy, an issue of 
both, Jurisprudence and Political Science, secondly, Culture, 
especially human communication in light of linguistic, 
thirdly, Psychology as a part of Criminology, and finally, 
Punishment as a genuine element of Criminal Law .  
12 
                                           
11  See again: Nussbaum, Martha, Equity and Mercy, Sexy and 
Social Justice (1999), pp. 157-58. See for instance as well, 
Shanske, Darien, Revitalizing Aristotle's Doctrine of Equity, 
Journal of Law, Culture and the Humanities, Vol. 4 (2008), p. 
352, (”… what Heidegger offers is a nuanced argument as to 
why Aristotle's manifest absorption in the concrete details of 
his face-to-face society is not a limitation to his doctrine, but a 
strength. We, no less than Aristotle, are enmeshed in logos, in a 
background ordering not at the command of our will, but we 
have a greater difficulty seeing this. Thus, where equity for 
Aristotle above all required expert engagement with logos, 
equity bids us first to acknowledge that the logos is.”).  
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II. Part 1: Democracy 
A. The Basic Ideals 
Therefore, the leading questions are: “What means a brutal 
criminal act in light of democracy”? And, how do we 
democrats punish the perpetrator in a both, “fair and 
humane” manner?  
13 
Expanding on this notion, “fair and humane” means abiding 
by the “Bill of Rights”, and “Human Rights” and 
“democracy” is meant in the “supranational” Western sense. 
Highlighting let us at first stick to “Western democracy” and 
to its great ideal of Freedom. Afterwards we should care for 
looking at three different kinds of counterpoints. They are 
the empirical aspect of the socio-psychological 
“groupishness”, a raw model for Eastern cultures, ruled by 
Solidarity, and the political systems of “peers”, dominated 
by equity. Finally we might need parts of all of them. We 
might even incorporate and at least weigh these aspects. 
14 
B. Freedom According to Hobbes 
The starting point for democracy is called “freedom”. But 
what does it mean to be – absolutely – free? According to 
Hobbes and others this is the “status naturalis”. He describes 
a kind of warlike case of competition of armed equals12 
15 
                                           
12  Hobbes, Thomas, Hobbes’ Leviathan, reprinted from the 
Edition of 1651 (1962), pp. 94 (“Nature hath made man so 
equal in their faculties of body and mind… And therefore if 
any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they 
cannot both enjoy, they become enemies and the result being 
that men endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.”). See 
 16 
which coerces the free persons to draw up a social contract 
installing a kingdom with their neighbors.13  
“Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without 
a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
Condition which is called Warre; and such warre, as is of 
every man, against every man. [...] In such a condition there 
is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no 
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported 
by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, 
and removing as require much force; no Knowledge of the 
face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; 
no Society, and which is worst of all, continual fear, and 
danger of violent death; And the life of Man, solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish, and short.” 
Simplified and a little bit altered, it is the freedom of the free 
warriors, but it is the freedom of the free pioneer farmers and 
of the free traders, too. 
16 
A “free person” is able to use violence or deception against 
others. Therefore he or she could be a “freedom fighter”, but 
he could also be a “despotic chief” or a “brutal criminal”. 
But all other free persons can deliberately do the same to 
him or to her.  
17 
                                                                                                           
also: Mensch, James, Political Violence. The Conflation of 
Sovereignty and Freedom, in: Hagedorn, Ludger / Staudigl, 
Michael (Hrsg.), Über Zivilisation und Differenz, Beiträge zu 
einer politischen Phänomenologie Europas (2008), 285 ff., 288 
(“Hobbes traces the origin of violence among men to their 
natural Equality.”).  
13  Hobbes, Thomas, De cive (lat. 1668, engl. 1651), Praefatio, 
sec. 14, Libertas, chap. 1. sec. 12 (“bellum omnium contra 
omnes” or “homo hominem lupus”). Pettit, Philip H., Can 
Contract Theory Ground Morality?, in: Dreier, James (Ed.), 
Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (2006), pp. 77-96. 
 17 
Without law, such a free person cannot be unlawful. Without 
a group, this free actor can’t act “antisocial” or even 
“asocial”.  
18 
In light of freedom a criminal person regresses by and with 
his act into a kind of a “status naturalis”. And, the calling for 
a “war on crimes” or on drugs or terrorism but meant as “war 
on criminal etc. persons” takes up at least this kind of 
metaphor of fighting. A fair trial means an “equity of 
arms”.14  
19 
And what is for Hobbes therefore a “state”? It is a mighty 
body of power, the Leviathan.15 Today the state is still a 
strong institutional player.  
20 
                                           
14  Or see “fair trial” – for instance in Art. 6 European Convention 
on Human Rights – defined by the military vocabulary 
“equality of arms” used by EGMR EuGRZ 1986, 127 
(Bönisch/A), Strafverteidiger (1993), 283, 284 (Lamy/B); 
Entscheidung vom 18.9.2006, Az. 26315/03, Rdnr. 35 
(Dogmoch/D), Urteil vom 12.0.2007 Az: 74613/01, Rdnr. 82 
(Jorgic/C), too.  
15  Mensch, James, Political Violence. The Conflation of 
Sovereignty and Freedom, in: Hagedorn, Ludger / Staudigl, 
Michael (Hrsg.), Über Zivilisation und Differenz, Beiträge zu 
einer politischen Phänomenologie Europas (2008), 285 ff., 290: 
“in absence of state power for example in isolated areas one 
passes on a journey a natural condition of war continues to 
persist”.  
 Zartmann, I. Williams, Introduction: Posing the problem of 
state collaps, in: Zartmann, I. Williams (Ed.), Collapsed States 
and Restoration of legitimate Authority (1995), pp. 1 
(“…situation, where the structure, authority (legitimate power), 
law and order have fallen apart.”… “when the state collapses 
and power (but not always legitimacy) fall down to local 
groups or are up for grabs”. Similar: Rotberg, Robert I., Failed 
States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, 
in: Rotberg, Robert I. (Ed.), State Failure and State Weakness 
in a Time of Terror (2003), pp. 1. 
 18 
C. Civilization According to Locke and Mill 
Let us pick up the simple word of (Western) “civilization”. 
At its core, it is meant in the restrictive sense of the word. It 
derives from civis, the Roman citizen.  
21 
Democracy according to Hobbes and others means from the 
developing the pure “status naturalis” into the “status 
civilis”. While Hobbes argued mostly with fear, Locke16 
emphasizes the advantage of the economical idea of 
cooperation of persons. Created by a social contract, a civil 
society is built on the important idea of private “persons”.  
22 
“In this personal Identity is founded all the Right and Justice 
of Reward or Punishment, Happiness and Misery being that 
for which every one is concerned for himself no mattering 
what becomes of any Substance, not joined to, or affected 
with that consciousness.” 
This kind of “personal identity” should be scrutinized for a 
person who harmed “Right and Justice”. At least, he or she 
acts “freely” in the sense of a status naturalis, but in the 
status civilis “wrong and unfair”. 
23 
Mill wrote in light of utilitarianism about a civilized 
community of sovereign individuals: 
24 
“That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because only part of the conduct of 
anyone, for which he is amenable to the society, is that 
                                           
16  Locke, John, Chapter XXVII “On Identity and Diversity” 
(1690), in: Nidditch, Peter H. (Ed.), An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (1975). 
 19 
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns 
himself his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.17
Simply being a “sovereign person” is to be kept in mind. 25 
D. Including Rousseau: State and Solidarity 
26 “Solidarity” seems to be, at least in the American and the British 
national versions of Western culture, not part of democratic 
“state” itself. The state is defined in the sense of international law 
and as a powerful acting person.18 Solidarity is more an element 
of morality19 and state free Christian charity20. It is a duty of the 
civil society, especially a call for each wealthy and educated 
private person. But in Democracy, the civil society rules the 
political system.21  
                                           
17  Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty (1859), Rapaport, Elizabeth (Ed.), 
9. ed. (1988), p. 9. 
18 See Art. 1 of the Convention of Montevideo (16. 12. 1933): 
“The state as a person of international law possesses the 
following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a 
defined territory; c) a government and d) capacity to enter into 
relations with other States.” 
19  See for the trinity of “Giving, Forgiving and Toleration”: Heyd, 
David, Supererogatory Giving: Can Derrida’s Circle be 
Broken, in: Byrd, B. Sharon / Joerden Jan C. (Hrsg.), 
Philosophia Practica Universalis, Festschrift für Joachim 
Hruschka zum 70. Geburtstag (2006), 149 ff.  
20 First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof, ...” (“establishment clause” or “free exercise clause”), 
see: Swomley, John, Religious Liberty and the Secular State 
(1987), pp. 48, and: Levy, Leonard, The Establishment Clause 
(1994), pp. 105.  
21  Kang, John M., Manliness and the Constitution, Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 32 (1) (2009), pp. 261 – 
 20 
Maybe for the American-British political culture22 it is more 
a system of checks and balances that leads in the end to a 
synthesis of both, civil society of private persons and union 
of states and peoples. The administrative core state is based 
on “Hobbes” and “Locke”, but the powerful and open 
minded US-American society seems to include at least parts 
of “Rousseau”, as well.23 He, whose name stands for the 
European continental “we model” of a “general will” has 
written on sovereignty:24  
27 
“As nature gives each man absolute power over all his 
members, the social compact gives the body politic absolute 
power over all its members also; and it is this power which, 
under the direction of the general will, bears, as I have said, 
the name of Sovereignty.  
                                                                                                           
332, p. 294 (…”civility can be an indispensable social adhesive 
for a community. As hinted by its etymological presence in 
“civilization” and “civil society,” civility is at base an ethic of 
cooperation…”). 
22  Halberstam, Daniel, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political 
Morality of Federal Systems, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90 
(2004), p. 731 (Form the abstract: “… this Article compares the 
dominant U.S. ‘entitlements’ approach, which looks only to 
political self-interest, with the dominant ‘fidelity’ approach in 
the European Union and in Germany, which demands that 
institutional actors temper political self-interest by considering 
the well-being of the system as a whole.”). Of course, both 
approaches are part of every kind of political system. Insofar 
(pre-)dominant is the crucial word.  
23  Mensch, James, Political Violence. The Conflation of 
Sovereignty and Freedom, in: Hagedorn, Ludger / Staudigl, 
Michael (Hrsg.), Über Zivilisation und Differenz, Beiträge zu 
einer politischen Phänomenologie Europas (2008), 285, 288, 
289, he criticizes Hobbes approach, 288: “Family, friends and 
tribal loyalties are all left out of account”. Indeed, without a 
state human live is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”, 
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Reprinted form Edition of 1651 
(1962), p. 131. 
24  Rousseau, Jean Jacques, The Social Contract or Principles of 
Political Right (1762), Book II, Chap. 4. 
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But, besides the public person, we have to consider the 
private persons composing it, whose life and liberty are 
naturally independent of it. We are bound then to distinguish 
clearly between the respective rights of the citizens and the 
Sovereign, and between the duties the former have to fulfill 
as subjects, and the natural rights they should enjoy as 
men.” 
But of course, his main intentions are expressed in these 
words: 
28 
“Each of us puts his person and all his power in common 
under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our 
corporate capacity, we receive each member as an 
indivisible part of the whole.”25
Therefore Western democracy is meant in the wider and 
supranational sense of a “democratic civilization” including 
both state and society.26 It is a kind of a “We-Group”. The 
Preamble of the Constitution for the United States as well as 
a lot of other Preambles of Western constitutions and of 
transnational conventions chose to use a Prologue to define 
proudly themselves and their main ethics, like “We the 
People…”27
29 
                                           
25  Rousseau, Jean Jacques, The Social Contract or Principles of 
Political Right (1762), Book I, Chap. 6.  
26  In law it is the problem of accepting transnational values as a 
part of the national constitution. But “civil society” ought to 
seek the third approach by claiming the supranational approach 
as their national one, or develop it “analog” from their own 
national spiritual heritage (Hobbes, Locke, etc.). Ferrarese, 
Maria Rosaria, When National Actors Become Transnational: 
Transjudicial Dialogue between Democracy and 
Constitutionalism,” Global Jurist, Vol. 9 (2009), Iss. 1 
(Frontiers), Article 2. Available at: 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol9/iss1/art2. 
27  See for example in connection with both immigration and 
citizenship: Abraham, David, Immigration and Social 
Solidarity in Contemporary Societies, The American Academy 
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“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a 
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.” 
E. Western Democracies  
What are the common elements of Western democracies of 
today?  
30 
The personal “status civilis”, defined by Locke with “Right 
and Justice”, has developed into “Human Rights”, mainly 
with the addition of “solidarity (fraternity)”, the “others” 
according to Mill. But, this secular value of solidarity derives 
from the Christian duty of Charity. For a short supranational 
answer let us take the modernized credo of the French 
Revolution: “Freedom (Liberty), Equity (Equality), and 
Solidarity (Fraternity)”.  
31 
Although “Fraternity” is the original word and it shows best 
the family model, maybe “Solidarity” is used more in 
Europe. This change of words indicates for instance that 
women in the 20th Century were granted the full Human 
Rights, including the right to vote. But solidarity is part of 
the communitarian approach, too.28 Another synonym for it 
32 
                                                                                                           
in Berlin, Social Science, May 6, 2010, p. 1. (“We are all 
multiculturalists now, goes the adage. But who exactly belongs 
to the national, cultural, and political unity of the ‘we’, – who 
are ‘we’ the people? And, moreover, what kinds of rights and 
obligations are entailed by being a member of this ‘we’?”). 
28  In light of communitarism, see: Mensch, James, Political 
Violence. The Conflation of Sovereignty and Freedom, in: 
Hagedorn, Ludger / Staudigl, Michael (Hrsg.), Über 
Zivilisation und Differenz, Beiträge zu einer politischen 
Phänomenologie Europas (2008), 285 ff., 287 (“The 
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is “community”29. But knowing this background, let us use 
the common Western Trinity of “Freedom, Equity, and 
Solidarity”. 
In detail, we can simply look into the yet to be enacted 
“Preamble” “Charter of Fundamental Rights” of the 
European Union, which gathers the European mainstream of 
ideas on democracy. It shows by the way a new kind of 
“Social Contract”. The free “European People” agreed on it 
each fostering their own special kind of Western democracy.  
33 
“The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union 
among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based 
on common values. 
Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is 
founded on the indivisible, universal values of human 
dignity, freedom, equity and solidarity; it is based on the 
principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the 
individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the 
citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, 
security and justice.” 
                                                                                                           
communitarian response … relies on the creation of social 
solidarity. It holds that the ultimate bulwark against 
factionalisms rending the consolation is a certain social 
cohesion or consensus one that translates into a sense of respect 
of the law and with this into a respect for the constitution 
itself.”). Mensch, James, Political Violence. The Conflation of 
Sovereignty and Freedom, in: Hagedorn, Ludger / Staudigl, 
Michael (Hrsg.), Über Zivilisation und Differenz, Beiträge zu 
einer politischen Phänomenologie Europas (2008), 285, 288, 
289, he criticizes Hobbes approach: “Family, friends and tribal 
loyalties are all left out of account”. Indeed, without a state, or 
better without a “reliable group” human live is “solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short”, as Hobbes says in Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, Reprinted from the edition of 1651 (1962), p. 131.  
29  In light of republicanism: Pettit, Philip, Republicanism. A 
Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), p. 110 (“Liberty, 
Equality and Community”). 
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“Freedom, Equity and Solidarity” are complemented by the 
more German Idea of “Human Dignity” (“Menschenwürde”, 
Art. 1, 1, of the German Constitution). Added are the two 
principles, democracy and the Rule of Law. Furthermore 
there is the trinity of “Freedom, Security and Justice”. It 
expresses rather the point of organizing a Western society. 
All these “values” and “principles”30 derive from the 
common European “spiritual and moral heritage”,31 for 
example from the books of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. 
34 
Of course, each nation maintains its own special 
combination of these elements influenced by its geographical 
neighbors, by landscape, by environment and by traditions 
etc. The nations of the European continent have mostly voted 
for an integrated system, based more on “Equity and 
Solidarity”, and less on “Liberty”. And again, the societies of 
Great Britain and the US, by the way both being kind of 
islands, tend to separate state and civil society32. Their 
35 
                                           
30  See: Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (1979), pp. 14.  
31 Amplifying Western preambles are related to constitutional 
question, see: Preuß, Ulrich, Disconnecting Constitutions from 
Statehood: Is Global Constitutionalism a Viable Concept?, in: 
Dobner, Petra / Loughlin, Martin (Eds.), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism? (2010), pp. 23. The Preamble-approach 
might offer a pragmatic answer, because constitutions, written 
or not, are part and core of the national identity, and of 
sovereignty of acting states, too. 
32  See: Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 32 (2) 
(2009), on the topic: “Is America Different From Other Major 
Democracies?”, Barnett, Randy E., The Separation of People 
and State, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 32 
(2009), pp. 451, 453 (“The separation of People and State is 
preserved by the Constitution because no one can claim to 
speak for the People: neither the President (unlike various 
dictatorships) nor the Congress (unlike the parliamentary 
systems that dominate throughout the rest of the world). This 
separation, like the separation of Church and State…)”. On the 
other hand the single states of the US are able to act in public 
trials in the name of their people and more, by elected and 
mandated persons. It is a kind of direct democracy using the 
service of a political structure of power and roles. Comparative: 
Kuzmics, Helmut / Axtmann, Roland, Authority, State and 
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political civilization is grounded more on personal “Equity 
and Liberty” in the sense of Locke. Sheldon for instance 
notes that pair of ideals as a strong tradition of the US.33 
Hence a separated strong “civil society” could add both the 
impulse of “angry revenge” and “friendly empathy”. It could 
offer private help by private organizations, both secular and 
religious. As windfall profit the society of the free and equal 
persons could keep this kind of political influence and the 
budget, which is needed for social projects apart form the 
state, too.  
And of course, each “free, equal and solidary” democrat acts 
within this simple framework, influenced by his national 
culture and maybe by the common Western civilization as 
well. Each voter easily could combine and weigh all three 
parts of the Western democracy in his political personality.  
36 
In so far “Democracy” is Western ideal that is based on the 
secular trinity of “Freedom, Equity and Solidarity”. Under 
37 
                                                                                                           
National Character. The Civilizing Process in Austria and 
England, 1700-1900 (2007), p. 59.  
 State means a liberal core state, defined for instance by Elias, 
Norbert, The Civilizing Process (Translation from German by 
Edmund Jephcott) (2000), pp. 344 (as “monopoly of taxation, 
together with the monopoly of violence”.). Maybe there is an 
“American Exceptionalism”, at least in light of Continental 
European approach. The separation is built on bipolar “check 
and balances” thinking, and is not seeking a holistic consensus 
of State and democratic society. But we have to keep in mind 
that every national culture has the need to be special one. 
Insofar every a culture is “home grown”, too. Opportunities and 
geography are important, as well. The US is in my opinion like 
Great Britain a kind of a natural protected island and a global 
trader, too. 
33  Sheldon, Garrett Ward, Constituting the Constitution: 
Understanding the American Constitution. Through the British 
Cultural Constitution, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 
Vol. 31 (2008), pp. 1129, 1133 (regarding Tocqueville), and 
see for the puritan churches etc. as the core of “private charity”: 
p. 1135. 
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this political roof all Western countries could best be 
assembled.  
F. My Background: Western Anthropology 
1. Philosophical Anthropology and Western Civilization 
My own background has evolved from a broad approach, 
and perhaps it is a special one. I would label it “Western 
Anthropology,” by which I mean a merger of Philosophical 
Anthropology and Western Civilization. 
38 
To begin with, Western Anthropology tries weighing all the 
main ideals and cultures, values and principles, rights and 
duties and all kinds of natural sciences. Complexity of a lot 
of subsystems rules even the superstructure of the post-
modern world. But, every anthropos (man) has – more or 
less deliberately – to bundle these large and important points 
of view. As he might define himself, they are the elements of 
his dignity, of his personality, of his identity, and they are 
the motivation of in his speech, of his decisions, of his acts 
etc. States are kinds of sovereign subjects and powerful 
agents, as well. Even Western states with written Western 
democratic constitutions have to weigh and to implement 
their collective identity, especially their civil rights, their 
political structure, their Rule of Law, etc.34 Typically the 
39 
                                           
34  All states need trying to contain centrifugal forces, and a lot of 
states are fragmented, see: Preuß, Ulrich, Constitutionalism in 
Fragmented Societies: The Integrative Function of Liberal 
Constitutionalism and its Challenges, in: Nergelius, Joakim 
(Ed.), Constitutionalism - New Challenges. European Law from 
a Nordic Perspective (2008), pp. 93.
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“oracle” of a constitutional high court is needed to adjust the 
actual balance of the national identity.35
On the higher (meta-) level, therefore we tend to find an 
order. Trinities are the simplest forms to bundle complexity, 
and they are done best in a dynamic mode and by dialectic 
steps. In Western societies we have to start with the early 
modern Dualism36 of mental and physical things. 
40 
Regarding the mental side, there is the normative “World of 
– mental – Subjects”, for instance in the sense of the “I”-
Subjectivism of Descartes37 (cogito ergo sum, I think – and 
doubt –, therefore I am). Critically revised, the “I”- 
Subjectivism serves as a mere assumption. Politically it is 
backed up by a consensus about the Free Will38 doctrine. 
Both, Subjectivism and Free Will doctrine which are 
strongly related Western axioms call for ascetic morality and 
41 
                                           
35  Regarding the aspect of implementation, for instance of UN-
Human Rights, James Nickel offers a theory to cope practically 
with the idealism inherent to the UN-Charter: Nickel, James, 
Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards A Theory of Supporting 
Relations between Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly, 
Vol. 30 (2008), pp. 984-1001 (from the abstract: “A central 
thesis is that the strength of supporting relations between rights 
varies with quality of implementation. Rights with low quality 
implementation provide little support to other rights. This is 
why early UN formulations of indivisibility said that it occurs 
when the rights in question are fully realized.”). Perhaps the 
same approach described – or will describe – the necessary 
weighing of constitutional rights inside Western democracies 
because each right fosters national priorities, meaning each is 
marked by different qualities of implementation. 
36  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Dualism (2007) (Howard 
Robinson), Of course, even “dualism” is a meta-label for 
several kinds of dualism. 
37  See the overview: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Descartes' Epistemology (2005) (Lex Newman). 
38  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Free Will (2005) 
(Timothy O’ Connor), and: Hume on Free Will (2007) (Paul 
Russell). 
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individual responsibility. All these ideals serve as the basis 
of Liberty39 and of Human Rights40. They open the path to 
personal autonomy41 and an inter-personal Democracy42. 
From my standpoint this might be a whole Western 
octagonal network of four pairs: The Descartes “I”-
Subjectivism and the Free will, Responsibility and Morality, 
Liberty and Human rights, and Autonomy and Democracy. 
And there is the empirical “World of Objects”, these 
“physical things” are in the focus of all the classic natural 
sciences. Insofar, as we, the species “homo sapiens” are a 
part of evolution and our body consists of chemical and 
physical elements, etc.  
42 
                                           
39  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Liberalism (2007) 
(Gerald Gaus and Shane D. Courtland). 
40  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Human Rights (2006) 
(James W. Nickel). Nickel, James W., Rethinking 
Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting Relations 
Between Human Rights, 30 Human Rights Quarterly (2008), 
pp. 984; Nickel, James W., Is Today’s International Human 
Rights System a Global Governance Regime?, 6 J. ETHICS 
(2003), pp. 353. Ishay, Micheline R., The History of Human-
Rights – From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (2008), 
p. 11. Hoffmann-Holland, Klaus, Ethics and Human Rights in a 
Globalized World. An interdisciplinary Approach, in: 
Hoffmann-Holland, Ethics and Human Rights in a Globalized 
World (2009), p. 3 (“We can distinguish between three 
generations of human rights: First generation liberal rights (e.g. 
freedom of speech, religion, freedom from torture), second 
generation social or collective rights (e.g. rights to work, equal 
payment, a standard of living, right to education, social 
security, food), and third generation solidarity and development 
human rights (e.g. right to development, right to peace, right to 
healthy environment). These generations all refer to particular 
philosophical, political and sociological backgrounds.”). 
41  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Autonomy in Moral and 
Political Philosophy (2009) (John Christman). 
42  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Democracy (2006) (Tom 
Christiano). 
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A rational “synthesis” of both worlds is nearly impossible, 
that is part of the logic of Dualism. Therefore a synthesis is 
either a rather formal and artificial one, or we develop a kind 
of a third world. As such a post-modern synthetic “third 
world” serves the “nature-based” approach of a cosmos of 
interacting cell-like sub-systems. The dynamic social theory 
of systems includes the whole “cultural social world”, too, 
and even each of their interacting human agents. And it 
might be that the “soul” or the “psyche” of psychology is a 
similar third and bridging entity. It tries balancing at least 
between the impulses sent from the body and the claims 
from the common sense of man. It forms and reforms 
permanently his personal identity. 
43 
Followers of syncretism appreciate the main aspects of all 
the three worlds, that one of normative Subjects, the other 
one of empirical Objects and of a holistic emergent cosmos, 
for instance of dynamic learning systems. Syncretists try 
hard to avoid building up a hierarchy between these three 
approaches. Therefore this Syncretism is a kind of an 
educated Pragmatism. But in the end, syncretism tends to the 
holistic “syn” (or “con) part of its root etymology, 
emphasizing the relativism and interdependency that, for 
instance, characterizes the dynamic model of half-autonomic 
systems. 
The ambivalent meaning of “Civilization” stems from such a 
syncretism. On one hand Civilization derive from the Roman 
“civis”. This normative approach to civilization leads to 
Western Democracies. On the other hand in Ethnology every 
political culture is a human civilisation. The main social 
groups develop and foster their own traditions, rites, symbols 
and even special languages. Human Groups range from 
small nomadic families to tribes, to nations and to the ideal 
of a mankind organized by the United Nations. Every larger 
population contains a whole network of subgroups and 
subcultures.  
Western Civilization might profit from a syncretic kind of 
order. Insofar it contains three pairs of elements: 1) from the 
44 
Kommentar [DS1]: One=synthe
sis? I do not understand the rest of 
this sentence. 
Kommentar [DS2]: Similar to 
what? 





perspective of subjectivism: “State and Man”; 2) from an 
objective perspective: “Power and Right”; 3) from a 
synthetic perspective: “Culture and Nature”43. Last not least, 
I might add special aspect. One might say, from the cultural 
point of view perhaps, that the Ideals of Western democracy 
are forming a kind of an “Ersatz-Religion”, based on 
Western Philosophy of State and Law.  
Kommentar [DS4]: We might 
talk about how to rewrite this 
footnote… 
Altogether, this approach could be baptized as a pragmatic 
and cross-disciplinary “Western Anthropology”. 
Some aspects are to be amplified: 
2. Reality of Groupishness and the Fiction of Freedom  
At first an old anthropological aspect might be amplified. 
The famous “status naturalis” of the free and wild human 
beings is, of course, a fictional idea. Nobody lives without a 
kind of socialization or without a civilization in a wider 
sense.44 We are “social and political animals” (zoon 
politikon) as well, which includes in light of democracy 
“Equity and Solidarity” and an existing “state”. Let us pick 
up the word of “Groupishness”45. In each and every form is 
groupishness (family, friends, tribes, nations or feeling as 
47 
                                           
43  Montenbruck, Axel, Zivilisation – Staat und Mensch, Gewalt 
und Recht, Kultur und Natur (2009). 
44  Montenbruck, Axel, Zivilisation. Staat und Mensch, Gewalt 
und Recht, Kultur und Natur (2009), Rdnr. 844 ff. 
45  Lipgar, Robert M., Beyond Bion’s Experiences in Groups: 
group relations research and learning, in: Bion, W.R. / Bion 
Talamo, Parthenope / Borgogno, Franco / Merciai, Silvio A. 
(Eds.), Bion’s Legacy of Groups (1998), pp. 25, 27 (human 
being as a “group animal”). Miller, Eric, A Note of the 
Protomental System and “Groupishness”: Bion’s Basic 
Assumptions Revisited, Human Relations, Vol. 51 (1998), pp. 
1495 (“unconscious basic assumption of behaviour of groups”).  
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part of a whole in the sense of animism, of a book religion or 
of global46 humanity etc.) a psychological feature of homo 
sapiens.47 And disturbance of groupishness is a form of 
socio-pathological insanity.48
                                           
46 Hoffmann-Holland, Klaus, Ethics and Human Rights in a 
Globalized World. An interdisciplinary Approach, in: 
Hoffmann-Holland, Ethics and Human Rights in a Globalized 
World (2009), p. 4 (“Globalization can be defined as ‘the 
growing interpenetration of states, markets, communications, 
and ideas across borders’. The impact of globalization is not 
restricted to a single system or discipline. It can be seen in 
(informations-) technology as well as in the social, cultural, 
economic, and political system, and it affects the way we talk 
(and think).”); Brysk, Alison, Introduction – Transnational 
Threats and Opportunities, in: Brysk, Alison (Ed.), 
Globalization and Human Rights (2002), p. 1; Gopinath, 
Chinnam, Globalization – A Multidimensional System (2008), 
p. 36; Clark, Robert P., Global Awareness – Thinking 
Systematically about the World (2002). Nickel, James W., Is 
Today’s International Human Rights System a Global 
Governance Regime?, 6 J. ETHICS (2003), pp. 353. 
47  See for the background, too: Markowitsch, Hans J. / Röttgen-
Rössler, Brigit, (Eds.). Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes, An 
Interdisciplinary Approach (2009), from the abstract of this 
anthology: Emotions have emerged as a topic of interest across 
the disciplines, yet studies and findings on emotions tend to fall 
into two camps: body versus brain, nature versus nurture. 
Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes offers a unique 
collaboration across the biological/social divide – from 
psychology and neuroscience to cultural anthropology and 
sociology – as 15 noted researchers develop a common 
language, theoretical basis, and methodology for examining 
this most socio-cognitive aspect of our lives. Starting with our 
evolutionary past and continuing into our modern world of 
social classes and norms, these multidisciplinary perspectives 
reveal the complex interplay of biological, social, cultural, and 
personal factors at work in emotions, with particular emphasis 
on the nuances involved in pride and shame. A sampling of the 
topics: (1) The roles of the brain in emotional processing. (2) 
Emotional development milestones in childhood. (3) Social 
feeling rules and the experience of loss. (4) Emotions as 
commodities? The management of feelings and the self-help 
industry. (5) Honor and dishonor: societal and gender 
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But in my opinion, this kind of secular fiction creating 
Freedom at first and adding groupishness afterwards is a 
genuine part of the logic of our secular democracy. Only 
freedom based on “nature” enabled the early modern 
European Humanism and their emerging science to 
substitute an existing social system that includes 
“monocracy” in form of a medieval religion.49 The “status 
naturalis” leads us still to universal “natural” Human Rights 
and allows the separation of state and religion.  
48 
The “status naturalis” is a philosophical kind of 
anthropology. It is based on the ability to act. Acting freely 
includes at least some biological goods (in ethical terms: 
values). This “freedom” is grounded on “life and health”; to 
add are “identity and individuality” and even “intelligence 
49 
                                                                                                           
manifestations of pride and shame. (6) Emotion regulation and 
youth culture. (7) Pride and shame in the classroom (emphasis 
added). See especially in light of ethnology: Röttgen-Rössler, 
Birgit, Gravestones for Butterflies. Social feeling Rules and 
Individual Experiences of Loss, In: Emotions (2009), pp. 164 
(form the abstract: about “emotional adjustment to change life 
circumstances” and a “process of interacting meaning making”. 
Based the aspects that the “cultures formulate “feeling rules” or 
“emotional imperatives” as well as …. “display rules”, 
illustrated by a “movement of parents that had suffered 
pregnancy loss or stillbirth and wanted to create a place for 
grief…”. 
48  In light of psychoanalysis: Adam, John / Scanlon, Christopher, 
Disturbances of “groupishness”? Structural violence, refusal 
and the therapeutic community response to severe personality 
disorder, International Forum of Psychoanalysis Vol. 18 
(2009), pp. 23 (“considering both the merits of the democratic 
therapeutic community model as a response to severe 
personality disorders and the danger, inherent in the model… is 
an unconscious identification with Diogenes in his barrel “). Of 
course there is the possibility of psychic insanity of “holing 
oneself up”, too, Adam / Scanlon in their abstract is usually 
“related to an experience of being violently excluded”. 
49  The historical bridge is the “Rationalized Christianity”, Taylor, 
Charles, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern 
Identity, seventh printing (1994), Chap. 14.1, regarding Locke. 
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and utilitarian ethics”. Obviously even “life” ranks second to 
this ability of being an actor. And only naturally free persons 
are able to “constitute” a democracy of free people, free 
from absolute monarchs and free from an absolute church.  
Pressed or lured into a democratic “We-group” the fictive 
free born persons change into the “status civilis”. But still, 
they are only bound absolutely by Natural Law, or maybe 
even only by that kind of Natural Law they are consenting to 
as reasonable, which is called “common sense”.50 And 
democrats keep parts of their old absolute freedom to 
themselves, especially the right of property and the pursuit of 
happiness, both mean to be simply free of domination.51  
50 
                                           
50  A “social unity” needs for their “socials arrangements” a 
“consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines”, Rawls, 
John, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 136, p. 41. For the 
importance of stability: Klosko, George, Rawl’s Argument 
from political stability, Columbia Law Review 94 (1994), pp. 
1882, 1885. See also: Barry, Brian, John Rawls and the search 
for stability, Ethics 105 (1995), pp. 880 and: Vaughan, 
Geoffrey, The Decline in the liberal tradition: The case of John 
Rawls, in: Peters, Martin / Schröder, Peter (Hrsg.), 
Souveränitätskonzeptionen. Beiträge zur Analyse politischer 
Ordnungsvorstellungen im 17. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (2000), 
157 ff.  
51  In light of republicanism: Pettit, Philip, Republicanism. A 
Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), pp. 51: “Liberty is 
Non-domination”, obviously freedom is defined mainly by 
autocracy, or see: p. 263: “republican civility…is… associated 
with… vigilance” regarding authorities, but “trust” is possible 
between persons. 
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On the other hand, each law – reasonable or not – includes 
enforcement.52 Even the peaceful status civilis cannot exist 
without power and a kind of domination. At it best it is a 
fairly shared and professionally organized democratic system 
of co-domination. 
51 
3. Freedom and Responsibility, Western Groupishness 
and Collective Guilt 
“Responsibility” to peers and “moral guilt” for harmful 
actions are parts of being “a free master of ones own free 
acts”. These, and the simple self inflicted risk called 
“liability”, are well known ethical functions of Freedom.53  
52 
                                           
52  See: Benjamin, Walter, Critique of violence, in: Benjamin 
Walter, Selected writings, Vol. 1, 1913-1926 (Bullock, M. / 
Jennings, M.W., Eds.) (2004), pp. 243 (“all violence as a means 
is either law-making or law-preserving”). Similar: Mensch, 
James, Political Violence. The conflation of Sovereignty and 
Freedom, in: Hagedorn, Ludger / Staudigl, Michael (Hrsg.), 
Über Zivilisation und Differenz, Beiträge zu einer politischen 
Phänomenologie (2008), 285 ff., 290 (“the violence that 
preserves the law is present in the use to enforce the law”). 
Ferner: Benjamin, Walter, Critique of Violence, in: Benjamin 
Walter, Selected writings, Vol. 1, 1913-1926 (Bullock, M. / 
Jennings, M.W., Eds.) (2004), p. 248 (“law-making is power 
making, assumption of power, and to that extent an immediate 
manifestation of violence”).  
53 Waller, Bruce N., Freedom, Moral Responsibility and Ethics, 
in: Consider Ethics: Theory, Readings and Contemporary 
Issues (2005), pp. 215-233; Hart, H.L.A., Punishment and 
Responsibility. Essays in the Philosophy of Law, Second 
Edition (2008) pp. 3 (principle of distribution); Krawietz, 
Werner, Risiko, Recht und normative 
Verantwortungsattribution in rechtsethischer Perspektive, in: 
Gerhardt, Volker / Krawietz, Werner (Hrsg.), Recht und Natur. 
Beiträge zu Ehren von Friedrich Kaulbach; Schriften zur 
Rechtstheorie, Heft 153 (1992), 147 ff., 166; Kant, Immanuel, 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Königlich Preußische 
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Psychology underlines similar human traits. As Bennett 
emphasizes, there is the strong impulse to apologize and to 
restore in a ritual way, but it is mainly related to harmed 
peers (friendship, collegiality or citizenship), and especially 
in cases of mere recklessness.54 In light of policy a sovereign 
Western state is a democratic “We-group” and acts free and 
responsibly, too. Being a democratic co-ruling participant of 
this “We-group” – instead of being a mere submissive 
member – a Western person can feel even a common 
“collective guilt”55 and the collective duty to condemn 
crimes.56  
53 
In light of social psychology McGarty and Blinc wrote57 54 
                                                                                                           
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hrsg.), Band IV (1903/11), 
334, Einl. IV, 329.  
54  Bennett, Christopher, The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical 
Theory of Punishment (2008), p. 47: “Responsibility, reactive 
attitudes and the right to be punished”; or p. 175: “The apology 
rituals and its rivals”. 
55  Branscombe, Nyla. R. / Sengoski, Ben / Kappen, Diane M., 
The measurement of collective Guilt. What it is and what it is 
not, in: Branscombe, Nyla R. / Doosje, Bertjar (Eds.), 
Collective Guilt in International Perspectives (2004), pp. 16. 
See p. 16 , combining all three: “pride, shame, and guilt” and 
explaining … “guilt stems from perceiving the self as 
responsible for an event that violates internalized moral 
standards or expectations”), p. 17 … “guilt by association can 
be experienced when the ingroup is perceived as responsible 
for an unjustified violation of accepted moral standards”. 
“Ingroup” is a synonym for a personal important “We-group”. 
And it should be kept in mind that “justified violations” are 
obviously accepted violations.  
56  Bennett, Christopher, The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical 
Theory of Punishment (2008), pp. 101: “The cycle of blame 
and apology”, pp. 152: “Institutional blame and apology”. To 
issue authorative condemnation of crimes, see Feinberg, Joel, 
The Expressive Function of Punishment, in: Feinberg, Joel 
(Ed.), Doing and Deserving (1970), pp. 95.
57  McGarty, Craig / Blinc, Ana-Maria, Refining the Meaning of 
the “Collective”, in Collective Guilt, Harm, Guilt and Apology 
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There are… two preconditions for collective guilt… people 
cannot feel collective guilt unless they (a) recognize that they 
belong to a group … and (b) they see that group as 
responsible for some humanitarian violation”. They would 
like to add two points: “(c) a continuing status advantage for 
dominant groups” and “(d) there is a conflict within the 
dominant group”. 
Taking that structure for granted that means that, vice versa, 
the morality of a democratic person is – partly – an 
internalized or accepted “group morality”. It derives from 
the special “common sense” of this group. The Western grid 
of ethics and the national model of “personal morality” are 
learned most by both, by education of a closer “We-group” 
and by social experience interacting with peers. Pressed in 
one word: by communication. The special ethnical or 
national ethics evolve of a common Western heritage and of 
a permanent Western exchange of thoughts. These kinds of 
culture draw from a “human precondition” toward fairness 
and compassion. Probably the basics of ethics are founded 
on the evolutionary principle of cooperation and the rule of 
reciprocity, too.  
55 
4. “Family” and “Duties”, Ideal of Eastern Civilizations 
In light of history, the Western kind of a “civilized Freedom” 
is a child of cultural change. It is an offspring of the 
European renaissance of antic “humane rationalism” 
combined with a progressive linear thinking, not a cyclic 
kind of living. Civilized Western culture includes a whole 
sophisticated philosophical trinity. Meant are at least: a 
56 
                                                                                                           
in Australia, in: Branscombe, Nyla R. / Doosje Bertjar (Eds.), 
Collective Guilt in International Perspectives (2004), pp. 112-
113. But that means on the other hand, if a humanitarian 
violation is justified by a (dominating) group there is no feeling 
of (collective) guilt. 
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mainly personal Subjectivism of liberal arts, an empirical 
objectivism of technology and a more social approach of a 
synthesizing postmodernism. But philosophy begins with 
and comes back to “cogito ergo sum” (I think, or I doubt 
therefore I am), an idea no scientist can be free himself of.  
A lot of Eastern cultures are mostly grounded on another 
fiction, which is the old medieval idea of being a mere 
member of a clan or a family.58 The holistic “We-person” is 
idealized in the same kind as the Western “I-person”. The 
ghosts of ancestors, a world of uncountable spirits and 
demons mixed with a meta-natural synthesis of yin and 
yang59 that means a kind of high sophisticated balancing, is 
57 
                                           
58 See: MacCromack, Geoffrey, The Legalist School and its 
Influence upon Traditional Chinese Law, Archives for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (2006), p. 59 
(“officials’ duties”, and regarding the Legalist School “that 
official should be accountable under the law for the correct 
performance of their duties”).  
59 See: Madl, Pierre, Abrahamic vs. Asian Values: The 
We(a)stern Society, in: Giordano, Christian / Patry, Jean-Luc 
(Hrsg.), Theorie und Praxis – Brüche und Brücken (2006), 103 
ff., 115 (Yin and Yang: “an explicit dualism, that expresses one 
implicit unit, such as good and bad, hot and cold, happiness and 
sadness, health and sickness, truth and falsity or life and 
death”). The Mankind lives between heaven (Yang) and earth 
(Yin). Madl, Abrahamic, Pierre, Abrahamic v., Asian Values: 
The We(a)stern Society, in: Giordano, Christian / Patry, Jean-
Luc (Hrsg.), Theorie und Praxis – Brüche und Brücken (2006), 
103 ff., 123: “a holistic understanding by introducing Trans-
disciplinarity”…See for the “non-egoism” of Buddhism: Madl, 
Pierre, Abrahamic vs, Asian Values: The We(a)stern Society, 
in: Giordano, Christian / Patry, Jean-Luc (Hrsg.), Theorie und 
Praxis – Brüche und Brücken (2006), 103 ff., 114: “Nirwana” 
is in Buddhism a kind of a whole living system of nature: the 
“‘indeed being’ arises from ‘not being’, just as sound is 
distinguished from silence and light from darkness”. From my 
rational Western point of view, instead of favoring the at least 
more dialogical Bipolarity of yin and yang, the cultures of 
Buddhism set the next formal step to a kind of biological 
Binarity of both, a natural “to be and not to be” but they always 
chose the synthesis. 
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presumably still ruling the “cultural cosmos” of China and 
lot of other greater empires in East Asia.60 From the Western 
point of view these We-cultures are meant to absorb Egoism, 
Individuality and Rationality. But these kinds of animistic 
spiritualism are part of Western spiritual heritage61 as well. 
“Honor” of the family and “shame” in cases of 
“disobedience” are combined with the human identity of 
being a mere submissive member.62 Sacrificing scapegoats 
does not only calm down collective emotions, they are also 
reasonable, because the group is responsible to higher spirits. 
The group sacrifices a precious asset, maybe a goat, a slave 
58 
                                           
60 Regarding India see Bhargava, Rajee, “Political Secularism: 
Why It Is Needed and What Can Be Learnt from Its Indian 
Version”, in: Brahm Levey, Geoffrey, / Modood, Tariq, (Eds.), 
Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship (2009), pp. 
82-109, (“…a strict political secularisms is alien to Indian 
culture and civilization”). 
61 For instance as Platonism: Gerson, Lloyd P., What is 
Platonism?, JHP 43 (2005), pp. 253. Platon, Phaidon, in: Eigler, 
Gunther (Hrsg.), Platon. Werke in acht Bänden. Griechisch und 
Deutsch, Band 3, Sonderausgabe (1990), 1 ff., 65a–67b, 82b–
84b; Platon, Politeia, in: Eigler, Gunther (Hrsg.), Platon. Werke 
in acht Bänden. Griechisch und Deutsch, Band 4, 
Sonderausgabe (1990), 521c–535a. 
62  The concepts of shame, guilt, and embarrassment are not fully 
standardized: Tangney, Miller, Flicker, Barlow, Are shame, 
guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions?, Journal of 
Personal and Social Psychology, 70 (1996), p. 1256. Fossum, 
Merle A. / Mason, Marilyn J., Facing Shame: Families in 
Recovery, W.W. Norton (1986), p. 5, (“While guilt is a painful 
feeling of regret and responsibility for one’s actions, shame is a 
painful feeling about oneself as a person.”). A person in that 
sense describes a kind of social role. In German: Seilder, 
Günter H., Scham und Schuld. Zum alteritätstheoretischen 
Verständnis selbstreflexiver Affekte, Zeitschrift für 
psychosomatische Medizin und Psychoanalyse 43 (1997), 119 
ff.; Marks, Stephan, Zur Funktion von Scham und 
Schamabwehr im Nationalsozialismus, in: Schönbächler, Georg 
(Hrsg.), Die Scham in Philosophie, Kulturanthropologie und 
Psychoanalyse, Zürich: Collegium Helveticum Heft 2 (2006), 
51-56. 
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or even a child.63 Crucial and the bridge to Individualism is 
the offering of the “only son”. The patriarch Abraham 
offered his son, as did the God of the New Testament.  
Another idea is the duty of solidarity, but not only with 
humans but with every living being. Time for these rural 
cultures is a cyclic one.64 They live more in a circle of 
generations. A collective holistic feeling, nature-based 
Animism and the holiness of ancestors are the great religious 
elements of that kind of civilizations.65 Even great imperial 
systems are still built on families (dynasties). 
59 
Simplified in light of politics, Western civilization of human 
“individualism” is based mainly more on “secular cities”. 
For the US it was at the beginning Boston against London. 
“Collectivism” in the wider sense of being a part of a natural 
animated world is grounded in a “religious, rural way of 
life”. They are normally built on a religion that claims 
solidarity with the whole universe and delivers rituals to 
support the feeling of collectivism and to suppress the 
outbreak of individuality.  
60 
                                           
63  For “scapegoat” see: Montenbruck, Axel, Sündenbock, in: 
Strafrechtsphilosophie. Vergeltung, Strafzeit, Sündenbock, 
Menschenrechtsstrafe (1995-2009) (2009), Rdnr. 300 ff. 
64  Eliade, Mircea, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of 
Religion, Trask, Willard R. (Trans.), New York: Harper 
Torchbooks (1961), p. 73; Montenbruck, Axel, Strafzeit, in: 
Strafrechtsphilosophie. Vergeltung, Strafzeit, Sündenbock, 
Menschenrechtsstrafe (1995-2009) (2009), Rdnr. 200. 
65  See: Western “Abrahamic tradition” opposing to “Asian 
values”: Madl, Pierre, Abrahamic vs. Asian values: the 
We(a)stern Society, in: Giordano, Christian / Patry, Jean-Luc 
(Hrsg.), Theorie und Praxis – Brüche und Brücken (2006), 103 
ff., 108 ff. (“male-types god-figure”), as well as “Hierarchy of 
Oppression”: (1) God – (2) Man – (3) Women – (4) Animals 
and Plants – (5) Nature – (6) Mother Earth, and see p. 123: “a 
holistic understanding by introducing Trans-disciplinarity”. 
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Therefore, instead of original “individual rights” these rural 
cultures develop a system of “collective duties”.66 They are a 
pressing commitment for the elder brothers, the chiefs and 
the kings. It is their holy task to protect and to nourish 
children, younger brothers or to support the members, who 
depend on a lord or on the king. But duties provide a 
derivative kind of rights of the members. And vice versa, 
individual rights entail, for instance, duties to other persons. 
In reality, each civilization meant in the wide sense of 
political culture has to cope with both, the interest of the 
young and free individuals and the group, governed by the 
generation of elders/parents.67
61 
62 Believing in one personal almighty God seems to be the 
bridge to the modern meaning of personality. It is combined 
with the “imago dei” model that men are animated by the 
holy spirit of God. But on the other hand, even the profane 
abiding by the sprit of humanity means relying on a last and 
ultimate reason and that constitutes a kind of a civil 
religion.68 And of course, in reality at least every great 
                                           
66  In light of formal jurisprudence on Right and Duty: Jaffey, 
Peter A., Hohfeld's Power-Liability/Right-Duty Distinction in 
the Law of Restitution. Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, Vol. 17 (2) (2004), pp. 295-313. 
67  Their decision could be internalized by the next generation, see 
as an example for the anthropological “generation” approach: 
Andenaes, Johannes, General Prevention Revisited: Research 
and Policy Implications, The Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology 66 (1975), pp. 338-365, p. 338 (341): “The 
consideration of moral effects calls for a long-term perspective. 
The legislation of one generation may become the morality of 
the next (…) If a substantial part of the impact of the law is 
believed to lie in its power to support and reinforce social 
norms, one would not expect rapid changes in crime rates as a 
result of less than drastic changes in law or law enforcement”.  
68  Bell, Daniel, Return of the sacred? The Argument of the future 
of Religion, in: Bell, Daniel (Ed.), The Winding passage Essay 
and Sociological Journeys 1960 – 1980 (1980), pp. 324, p. 347 
(“Religion is … a constitutive aspect of human experience, of 
human culture”); Müller, Alois, Religion, Kultur und Ethik 
unter Säkularisierungsbedingungen, in: Kohler, Georg / Kleger, 
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contemporary mainstream culture of secularism provides a 
lot of all other kinds of open or secret subcultures thereby 
counterbalancing all the other kinds of danger of a strict 
secular fundamentalism. But in the end there is a cultural 
decision to be made, either favoring more the individualism 
of cities or sticking to the old system of collectivism ideally 
organizing best rural countries.  
As to the religious aspect, there is a secular “cognitive 
science of religion” which is represented for instance by 
social-anthropologist Harvey Whitehouse. He offers an 
impressive analysis of probably universal elements of 
religion. Granted that they are a genuine part of the human, 
they ought to be features of the secular “ersatz-religion” of 
the Western democracies, too, which are expressed in their 
semi-religious Preambles.69  
63 
Among other elements he mentions “Deference, Moral 
obligation, Punishment and reward”. “Punishment and 
reward” are both part of the tit for tat principle of equity. 
Deference is a strategy of social hierarchies. Moral 
obligations are part of the personal dignity of men.  
64 
                                                                                                           
Heinz (Hrsg.), Diskurs und Dezision, Politische Vernunft in der 
wissenschaftlich-technischen Zivilisation. Hermann Lübbe in 
der Diskussion (1990), 285 ff., 293 ff. 
69  Harvey Whitehouse, Cognition and Religious Evolution, 
Ethnology and Anthropology, Vol. 3. No. 3 (2008), pp. 35, p. 
36 (“Figure 1 lists a number of traits that might be associated 
with the category ‘religion’. These traits are probably found, in 
some shape or form, in all human societies or at least are very 
widespread and historically recurrent. The CSR” – cognitive 
science of religion – “has attempted to account for this 
recurrence in terms of the shaping and constraining: effects of 
universal cognitive mechanisms.” His list contains: “Afterlife, 
Beings with special powers, Signs and portents, Creationism, 
Spirit possession, Rituals, Ritual exegesis, Deference, Moral 
obligation, Punishment and reward, Revelation, … Cross-
culturally recurrent religious repertoire.”). 
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Another core religious aspect is “afterlife”. Regarding this 
element, the Western civil society generated a secular 
counterpart developing a cultural tradition of both oral 
narrative stories and songs about famous ancestors and 
especially written semi-holy books of and about great 
philosophers, history books about leaders etc. 
65 
“Beings with special powers, Signs and portents, 
Creationism, Spirit possession”, they in Western 
Democracies are reflected by elected Presidents, by 
Lawmakers etc., and of course by every other kind civil idol, 
too. In Western democracies each person participates in this 
pool of “natural” gifts which are the background for his 
personal Human Rights.  
66 
“Rituals, Ritual exegesis, The Sacred”, they are a part of the 
juridical system. Rites dominate of each courtroom session, 
and lawyers are educated in exegesis. Both the role of a 
judge, as in “contempt of court”, and the reasonability of a 
jury, as in “reasonable doubts”, reflects their special kind of 
secular holiness. 
67 
Western Preambles (and constitutions) should be seen as a 
kind of political Ersatz-religions. Preambles generate 
collectivizing aspects, like the collective “believing and 
trusting”, or the “abiding and submitting”. They are 
associated with phrases like “it’s law” and are symbolized by 
the spiritual power of “Rule of Law”.  
68 
These preambles and phrases are elements of both semi-
religious Western ethics and Democratic “leadership”. We 
might add phrases like “it’s common sense” or “it’s science”. 
But of course, on the other hand, these are more open, at 
least in an ideal “discourse”, in which each reasonable and 
therefore “free” person could take part. 
69 
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5. “Peers and Asceticism”, the Limitation of raw Models 
There should be a third kind of culture, too. In that simple 
strand of thoughts it is ruled mainly by Equity. Smaller 
groups of “peers” draw from altruism and respect, 
suppressing egoism as well as compassion. Domination of 
Equity often evolves into a holy or a secular Order of Equals. 
Asceticism, proud worshiping and self-sacrificing are core 
features of Equity. Societies dominated by aristocratic 
warriors, by a network of cloisters (including Buddhism), or 
by both elements as the Knights Templar are well-known 
examples. In a wider sense every caste systems is founded 
not only on a holy hierarchy, but by relying on a lot of 
groups of peers, too. Peer groups in Western law 
enforcement and recruits in war times are lead by these 
ethics, as well. Common Rituals, special uniforms and secret 
signs are the brand mark for peers. 
70 
Apparently, there are not a lot of other ethical alternatives to 
economic individualism, emotional collectivism and dutiful 
Equity. But each real political culture that is dominated by 
one of these main three ideologies (Freedom, Equity or 
Solidarity) has to cope, at least, with both of the others. The 
Western civilization, although dominated by Freedom, needs 
and knows the advantages of being “corrected” by the pair of 
“Equity” and “Solidarity”. 
71 
Each ruling ideal has to “internalize” both the other kind of 
thinking and has to “tolerate” their subcultures, at least de 
facto. This kind of handling is based on the two old 
conditions to dominate other systems peacefully: embracing 
strong competitors and ruling by the motto of “divide et 
impera”. Furthermore, each society has to cope as well with 
two – negative – elements, the influences of foreign cultures 
and some brand new aspects.70 Most of the novelties are 
72 
                                           
70  Montenbruck, Axel, Zivilisation. Staat und Mensch, Gewalt 
und Recht, Kultur und Natur (2009), Rdnr. 1097. 
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delivered by natural sciences. And, of course, that – open-
ended – trinity model of civilization is a simple one. But, 
remember the pragmatic logic of Ockham´s Razor.  
Therefore, democracy too has to weigh – and to harmonize 
as far as possible – a political trinity, 
73 
(1) individualism as freedom,  
(2) mutuality as equity and  
(3) collectivism as solidarity. All three kinds of arguments 
are important.  
But the responsible decision must be made form the position 
or role of a democratic person. That means taking culturally 
for granted, that human beings are able to argue and to 
decide “free”.  
Again; this is a very simple supranational model of Western 
democracy. Each real Western nation balances and re-
balances a special kind of combination of this democratic 
trinity every day. Furthermore, each one of the “united 
states” within the main and federal culture of the US might 
be proud of its own kind of the US-Democracy. 
74 
6. Western Diagram: Freedom, Equity and Solidarity 
The secular Credo of democracy, Freedom, Equity and 
Solidarity, and some elements of its outcome could perhaps 
be compressed into this diagram. And, we only need ideals at 
all because reality shows us that for every “ought” there is a 
special case of violation to be thought with. The serious ones 















































A free market 
Civil Economy: 





Ability to act, to 
work, to move 
Civil Power: 
Creating networks 























Personal duty to 
yourself 
Morality: 
Personal duty to 
peers 
Morality: 
Personal duty to 
society 
 
76 These are at least typical examples. Regarding Western 
democracy, they are an important part of my position, too.  
G. First Thesis: Three Democratic Steps to Punishment 
Regarding punishment and crime, we might try the following 
three steps:  
77 
Step 1: What is democracy? The answer is given, although 
democracy is based on “Freedom”, it is a special national 
combination of: “Freedom, Equity and Solidarity”.  
Step 2: In Light of Democracy what are criminal acts of a 
criminal person?  
His actions are “free”, but “unfair and inhumane”. The 
criminal person  
(1) is gaining freedom by taking freedom,  
(2) is building up a hierarchy (domination) instead of 
accepting fair Equity  
(3) is not showing solidarity, sympathy or empathy  
 47 
Step 3: In what way is this response democratic? The main 
point is, because even a brutal perpetrator still has his 
national “constitutional rights” and his “fundamental human 
rights”. 
In detail,  78 
(1) We, i. e. the democratic society, take away his “physical 
freedom” and we dominate him, maybe for 20 years. 
(2) But that’s “fair”, because it is not more than reciprocity; 
it is only an “eye for an eye”.  
(3) And it is less than that, it is “humane”. There is the 
permanent offer of “reconciliation” to the prodigal son. 
About the special case of death penalty, I personally would 
add: Inside of an existent democracy, the “state” cannot 
logically have the right to eliminate one of its “royal rulers”. 
Even its co-rulers can’t do it within the limits a democracy. 
But of course, they can do it by regressing into a “status 
naturalis”. 
79 
And, avoiding the dilemma of the “maybe fair, but 
inhumane” death penalty, altogether by taking away 
“freedom” but offering “fairness and solidarity” is a 
democratic kind of punishment. 
80 
 48 
III. Part 2: Culture  
A. Communication and Culture  
Let us look at the common cultural background of 
Democratic states regarding criminal acts and punishment. 
To begin with, I would like to offer a six-pointed statement, 
seemingly being self-evident. 
81 
(1) The core of each humane society is “communication”. Or 
as Basil Bernstein71 says: “The semantic function of a 
language is the social culture”.  
82 
In a more sophisticated vein Roy Rappoport writes: “The 
terms “communicate” and “community are obviously 
cognates. “Communicate” is derived from Latin 
communicare “to make common”. And he adds: “A human 
community is an association of persons standing upon a 
common ground.” And furthermore: “Those who hold 
ultimate sacred Postulates in common constitute 
communities as fundamental in nature as those defined by 
descent from common ancestors, for they accept common 
foundations for their testimony, their pledges, their 
institutions and much of their general understanding of the 
world.”72  
That is the more hidden social root of the famous “common 
sense”; the other of course, is the enlightenment and arguing 
with reason.  
                                           
71  Bernstein, Basil, Class, Codes and Control, Vol. I, Theoretical 
Studies towards a Sociology of Language (1971), p. 54. 
72  Rappaport, Roy A., Ritual and Religion in the making of 
Humanity (1999), p. 326. 
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(2) Communicating creates a kind of “common sense”. In 
light of anthropology and the theory of systems and the 
words of Maturana / Valera73, there is a kind of self 
organized “consensual domain of behaviour”. A group 
needs an analogy to sub-human herd or swarm or at least a 
“common behaviour”.74 By learning to communicate in our 
special languages, we humans become socialized, as well. 
But obviously, we are not strictly bound to our group and its 
“common behaviour”. Insofar the special human language is 
built on abstractions and symbols.75  
83 
(3) Communication implies the basics of democracy and vice 
versa, because communication means “dialog” or an open 
“discourse” and requires a “forum”. The alternative is a 
“decision” without open communication in a forum. That 
means secrecy, domination of an elite, and animosity.  
84 
                                           
73  Maturana, Humberto R. / Valera, Francisco, Autopoesis and 
Cognition – The Realization of the Living (1980), p. 50 
(“creation of consensual domain of behaviour”). 
74 Extremely grounded on consensus for instance: MacIntyre, 
Alasdair, After Virtue (Second corrected Edition with 
Prescript) (1985), pp. 69: morality is a fiction, constructed by a 
community and by communication. But “tit for tat” indicates 
that at least reciprocity is a social biological strategy. 
75  In light of anthropology: Rappaport, Roy A., Ritual and 
Religion in the making of Humanity (1999), p. 7: “Not only is 
language is the human way of life” but “the appearance of the 
symbol” and p. 8: “With the symbol an entirely new form of 
information (in the widest sense of the word) appeared in the 
world”. He continues: “the language is central to human mode 
of adaption”… “but there is a great inversion”…. if the 
metaphor of inversion (surely an oversimplification) is at all 
apt, then it is appropriate to propose that the proposition 
favored in human social systems are about such conceptions as 
God, Freedom, Fatherland, and The Good.” 
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(4) At the very least, each society is not only based upon 
communication, it “is” communication.76 But it “is” 
collective coercion, too. In reality, in every social system 
there are both “discourses” and “decisions”, because you 
cannot only discuss. After a while, a decision must be made. 
And normally, even the decision of a plenum is prepared by 
a smaller group of leaders. On the other hand, even a cabinet 
or a board cannot work without a kind of open discourse.  
85 
(5) When communicating, we use and think in our own 
“common language”. We are living in a cage, a kind of 
“national” home and in a wider kind of Western cultural 
system. To understand other systems, we have to learn their 
art of communication. But, normally we would not be able to 
become a real “native speaker”.77  
86 
(6) Structurally, we have to cope with the same problem of 
cultural differences when a meta-discipline as Philosophical 
Anthropology invites Jurisprudence, Political Science, 
Linguistics, Psychology and Criminal Law to an 
interdisciplinary78 conference about Punishment and Crime. 
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76  Luhmann, Niklas, Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat 
(1981), 19 f.; Simmel, Georg, Soziologie. Untersuchungen über 
die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, in: Rammstedt, Otthein 
(Hrsg.), Gesamtausgabe, Band 11 (1992), 32 f.  
77  In sense of “systemic function of grammar”: Halliday, Michael 
A. K., Introduction to Functional Grammar, 2. ed. (1994), p. 
15. Ullman, M. / Corkin, S. / Coppola, M. / Hickok, G./ 
Growdon / J. H., Koroshetz, W. J. / Pinker, S., A neural 
dissociation within language: Evidence that the mental 
dictionary is part of declarative memory, and that grammatical 
rules are processed by the procedural system, Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience 9 (1997), pp. 289-299, or: Pinker, 
Steven, So How Does the Mind Work? Mind and Language, 20 
(2005), pp. 1-24. Eco, Uberto, Das offene Kunstwerk (1962), p. 
66 (The language is the cultur: “…die Sprache ist wirklich die 
eigentliche Grundlage der Kultur. Im Verhältnis zur Sprache 
sind alle anderen Systeme von Symbolen akzessorisch oder 
abgeleitet”.). 
78  With well known but sometimes angrily suppressed problems 
of understanding and respecting each other, Gluckman, Max, 
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Me, I am originally a “learned native speaker” in the world 
of norms (“ought”), which Law is an old part of. Exactly I 
got my degrees concerning the small unit of national German 
Law, especially of crime and legal punishment, which is of 
course imbedded in German and Western jurisprudence. 
Arguing with empirical aspects, which I have to borrow by 
famous colleagues, means switching into another kind of 
world, that of mere facts. The only solace is that, vice versa, 
the same risk of misunderstanding exists. 
(6) But in democracy every ruler, and that means every 
democrat, has the right to ask his own Universities to give 
answers that are balanced between the faculties. And then we 
are back again at scrutinizing the human level of a pragmatic 
Philosophy, of languages and symbols.  
88 
A simple answer might be this one. At least in Western 
languages we have a common system of simple grammatical 
rules. One of them covers kinds of personalities and groups: 
I, You, He/She /It, We, You, they. These basic grammatical 
elements might serve as a mirror for our political abilities. 
89 
Weighing this six-pointed division of grammatical subjects, 
it is based more on a kind of Anthropology of 
communication in the sense of Michael Tomasello79 than on 
a Philosophy of Language. But, for instance John Searle’s 
sophisticated theory of speech acts80, which are the based on 
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Closed Systems and Open Minds. The limits of nativity in 
Social Anthropology (1964), p. 17. 
79  See for the evolutionary origins of human communication and 
their fundamental structure: Tomasello, Michael, Origins of 
human Communication (2008), see: 7.3 (Language of shared 
Intentionality). 
80  “How to do things with words” is a key phrase associated with 
his approach, Searle, John, Speech Acts: An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Language (1969), pp. 57-719; Searle, John R. / 
Vanderveken, Daniel, Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts 
(1985), p. 5 (“A theory of illocutionary logic of the sort we are 
describing is essentially a theory of illocutionary commitment 
as determined by illocutionary force. The single most important 
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strong or weak “rules” and his kind of social 
constructivism81, might serve for the philosophical part as a 
theoretical roof for these points too, at least for his followers.  
By all means, Bio-Psychology might add some points. For 
example, there might be an important difference between a 
discourse and the real motivations82 for a hard decision. Or 
perhaps blind solidarity is much more important than 
democratic Western societies are inclined to believe to 
believe about themselves.  
91 
At first we must look at Democracy and try connecting the 
common Grammar of Western languages with the ideals, 
again trinity, of Democracy. It might be that the Grammar is 
a reflection and a mirror of the human ability to live in kinds 
of democracies. The question whether there is or there was a 
universal human grammar is not to be answered. 
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question it must answer is this: Given that a speaker in a certain 
context of utterance performs a successful illocutionary act of a 
certain form, what other illocutions does the performance of 
that act commit him to?”. See too: Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Speech Acts (2007) (M. Green), 2.3. See too: 
Lepore, Ernest / van Gulick, Robert (Eds.), John Searle and his 
Critics (1991). 
81  Searle, John R.: The Mystery of Consciousness (1997), p. 112 
(“where consciousness is concerned, the appearance is the 
reality.”). Tomasello, Michael, Origins of human 
communication (2008), pp. 246 (for “requesting”), pp. 270, ( 
for “informing”), pp. 282 ( “sharing and narrative”), pp. 295 
(for a system of “Conventionalizing of Linguistic 
Construction”). But, “Personalities or Names” are, at least, not 
a main part of this grammatical approach. 
82  This might be part of what Searle calls the “Background”. 
Searle, John R., The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), ch. 8 
(Background is a set of abilities, capacities, tendencies, and 
dispositions that humans have and that are not themselves 
intentional states.). 
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B. Persons in Grammar of Western Languages  
Therefore, let us look at Western languages. The common 
grammar of our languages indicates a great lot: 
93 
Obviously, grammar serves us at least with three groups of 
personalities. And in my opinion on one hand they are 
“democratic” ones:  
94 
“I”-person “You”-person 
(meaning an ideal 
“me- and-you 
dialog”), 
both partners are 
“peer-persons”  
“We”-person 
(dominating “I persons”, 
and “peer-persons”)  










Let me add; in light of anthropology ethics evolve of a 
genetic human pre-program of at least three kinds. Packed in 
a utilitarian model basic ethics draw from:  
95 
(1) the – biology dominated – “emergency rights” of 
individual surviving (I or Me),  
(2) the – economical – price for “cooperation”, that is called 
fairness (You and I as partners or peers) and  
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(3) the – emotional – price for the advantage of groups, 
including the “social contract of peers and of generations” 
solidarity (We). 
On the other hand, there are alternatives: We are able to 
separate and classify persons into an alien person, into a 
“He-person/his” or into a “She-person/hers” or into a “They-
group/theirs”.  
96 
And more, driven by interests and emotions we are able 
switch abruptly between “in-group” and “out-group”.83 That 
kind of freedom is to be kept in mind. 
97 
Perhaps, even more important, each personal pronoun (I, 
You, He or She and They) could be used in a Western 
language as both “active” and “passive”. The person could 
be a “decision maker” or be a “victim”. And the passive 
form implies “domination” and “hierarchies”. We are able to 
switch between “passive” and “active”, too.  
98 
Furthermore, our grammar even includes a kind of “absolute 
power”. Our Western Indo-European languages provide a 
neutral “third person” (“it”) and a possessive form (“its”). 
That means, we active persons are able to neutralize our 
whole “environment” into “objects”, or according to Locke: 
“substance”. After that, we are “free” to use or to destroy 
“them and their goods”, as though we were a tyrannical 
“owner”. Less obvious, but in a similar context, is the 
changing of a person into grammatical objects: “me”, “us” 
and “them”. It makes becoming the person a grammatical 
subject.  
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83  In light of social psychology, see: Branscombe, Nyla R. / 
Sengoski, Ben / Kappen, Diane M., The Measurement of 
Collective Guilt. What it is and what it is not, in: Branscombe, 
Nyla R. / Doosje, Bertjar (Eds.), Collective Guilt in 
International Perspectives (2004), pp. 16: (“Emotions can be 
ephemeral. How events are appraised and the subjective 
experience that generate can rapidly shift with changes in the 
social context.”).  
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And still more: Using the “it” form we can turn with “it” not 
only wild animals into “objects”. For instance, and far away 
of political systems accepting slavery to a marksman of 
special forces, a human being is simply a “target”. In 
economics and politic we speak incorrectly of “human 
resources”. A prisoner in Alcatraz was merely a “number” 
etc. We developed and kept the grammar for it.  
100 
At least, let us have a look at the context of “grammar, 
decisions and the law”. In our Western languages we have 
both  
101 
(1) “past-tense” meant for memories. But they serve to solve 
“present” problems, for example “to try cases”.  
(2) We have “future tense”. They are made for expectations 
developing plans in the “present” for the future, for example 
“to make laws”.  
(3) But, in reality we use both in light of the “present 
situation” – to decide and to act now.  
Apparently, the complexity of the human ability to 
communicate is impressive and it dominates us.84 With a lot 
of symbols structured by a grammar we argue and exchange 
feelings. We communicate with other real persons, with 
other dead persons or even fictional ones or simply within 
ourselves. Therefore language represents the grid of each 
culture, and it indicates a lot about our human ability acting 
peacefully or in warlike manner with each other. 
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84 Gould, Stephen, Jay, Full House: The spread of Excellence 
from Plato to Darwin (1996), p. 148 (“the most complex 
creature”); Wright Robert, Non-Zero, The logic of Human 
Destiny (2000), p. 267. At least collectively, homo sapiens are 
able to understand and use some of the basic rules of nature. 
That means they have “learned” and “internalized” these 
fundamental parts of the cosmos.  
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Of course, even switching actively between groups, we know 
about the latent alternatives. By the way, at least in that kind 
we humans are “free” – far off the philosophical doubts and 
the dilemma of proving “free will”.  
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In current socio-psychology a lot of authors describe this 
kind of phenomenon much more sophisticated. They probed 
identity groups as “in-groups”, and the separation from “out-
groups”. These in-groups are relatively manifested, and are 
built for instance on simple racial thinking.85 In light of 
anthropology obviously racial attributes are a form of mask 
used for both, separating others and collectivizing one self. 
Actors in antique theatre plays were wearing that kind of 
mask. Even our Western word “person” (from Latin: per 
sonare) originated from that metaphor of roles.  
104 
We live therefore not only with the humane ability of group-
building and switching between them but, of course, with the 
existence of permanent in-groups and neighborly out-groups, 
as well. It is the well-known social role-playing, such as 
being a member of a family, a partner in a peer group, a 
citizen of a community, or a believer and a member of a 
religious group etc. Add to this the private personal network 
of each individual. Altogether these roles form our social and 
to a large extent our private personality. Behind masks, roles, 
persons and memberships etc. there are the very same kinds 
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85  Powell, Adam A., Inequality as Ingroup or Outgroup. 
Disadvantage: The impact of groups focus on collective guilt 
and interracial attitudes, Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, Vol. 31 (4) (2005), pp. 508-521; Saguy, T. / Dovidio, 
J.F / Pratto, F., Beyond Contact: Intergroup Contact in the 
context of power relations, Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, Vol. 34 (2008), pp. 432-445; Harth, N.S. / Kessler, T. 
/ Leach, C.W., Advantage Group’s Emotional Reactions to 
Intergroup Inequality: The Dynamics of Pride, Guilt and 
Sympathy, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 34 
(1) (2008), pp. 115-129; Lowery, B.S ./ Knowles, E.D. / 
Unzueta, M.M.; Framing inequity safely: Whites Motivated 
Perceptions of Racial Privileg, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 33 (9) (2007), pp. 1237-1250. 
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of human beings, as Anthropology indicates and Western 
Democracy is built on. But without that changeable second 
skin, we would be without communication, cooperation and 
help, lonesome, vulnerable and “naked”. 
On one hand our Ego is partly formed by the “others” (peers) 
and our existing in-groups (family-model). But on the other 
hand each communicating individual is it acting and keeping 
the peers and the families alive. 
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At least in extreme cases of survival there are often decisions 
to be made. We have to choose clearly a particular role. We 
have decide – or not – in favor of ourselves (for me), or for a 
member of our peer group (for both, you and me), or for our 
family (including the national state or even mankind). And 
we must act upon our decision. Before this crucial act, or 
certainly afterward, we can better understand our “self” as 
mirrored by our actions.  
107 
To put it simply, the reduction of the complex language in 
form of a grammar shows us the grid of our human 
possibilities and the kinds of our ethics. 
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C. Grammar and Western Philosophy  
Those basic linguistic forms ought to be filled by a matching 
substance. For Western Philosophy especially the “it” allows 
separation between “Subject and Object”, known as well as 
the dualism of the normative “ought” and the empirical 
“being”. Hume is famous for stating the impossibility of the 
conclusion from “be world” to the “ought world”.86 The 
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86  Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature (1740), III, § 2: 
“Moral Distinctions not derived from Reason”. Hume, David, 
Treatise on Human Nature, I §§ 4, 6, (“I never catch myself at 
any time without a perception and never can observe anything 
but the perception”). In German: Brandt, Reinhard, “Personal 
Identity” bei Locke, in: Byrd, B Sharon / Joerden, Jan C. 
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enlightenment, science and the special human rights are 
based upon this sharp separation. 
Not treating others like “mere objects” is one of the virtues 
for Kant assigns to being a moral person.87 Hegel gave the 
metaphor of not treating men as though you were beating a 
dog with a stick pointing out the old difference between 
acting like an animal or behaving like an honorable man, 
because of the human ability to act freely (to have a free 
choice).88 And, treating men as “mere objects” these are the 
words contemporary German Constitutional Court uses to 
define a violation of “dignity of men” (Art. 1, 1 
“Menschenwürde”), which equals an amendment.89 For the 
US Supreme Court dignity of men is at least the “basic 
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(Eds.), Philosophia Practica Universialis, Festschrift für 
Joachim Hruschka zum 70. Geburtstag (2006), p. 45. Frankena, 
William K., Der naturalistische Fehlschluß, in: Grewendorf, 
Günther / Meggle, Georg (Eds.), Seminar: Sprache und Ethik 
(1974), 83 ff. 
87  Kant, Immanuel, Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Erster Teil, 
Metyphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (1797), Kants 
gesammelte Werke (Akademieausgabe ab 1902), Band VI, 453. 
88  Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im 
Grundrisse (1821), in: Hoffmeister, Johannes (Hrsg.) (1999), § 
99 Zusatz. 
89  BVerfGE 115, 118, 152 (BVerfGE 39, 1, 42; 72, 105, 115; 109, 
279, 311) – translated by autor: “Each human being owns as 
person this dignity regardless of his personal abilities, his 
physical or mental status, his acts or his social role”. BVerfGE 
87, 209, 228; 96, 375, 399: “But Human Rights especially 
freedom deriving from dignity, are limitable to a certain 
amount and controlled by law and judges” (translated by 
author). For human dignity in light of punishment: Albrecht, 
Peter-Alexis, Menschenwürde als staatskritische 
Absolutheitsregel, in: Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (KritV), Laudatio für 
Burkhard Hirsch (2006), 295 ff., 297.  
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concept underlying the Eight Amendments”.90 Of course, the 
theological root of dignity of men is the animistic idea of 
having a “soul” or “spirit”. For the European humanists for 
instance, the Prussian Pufendorf combines both “reason, 
soul” with “dignity” as features of a human being.91  
But please note, the much more ancient animistic religions 
and the contemporary Eastern Buddhism do not really need 
an “it”. For their holistic thinking and feeling, there exists no 
Dualism of two worlds. There is only “one world”. Every 
phenomenon has a “soul” that must be respected. The secular 
reduction of the two worlds to simple world of phenomenon 
is a holistic thinking, too. The plural Western philosophy 
knows about this holistic thinking and feeling, too.92 The 
philosopher Husserl, for instance, developed it, consequently 
based on psychology93, which in early times and in oral 
societies was fostered by shamans, as well. Even the 
contemporary socio-biological approach, the theory of living 
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90  “The basic concept underlying the Eight Amendment is nothing 
less than the dignity of man.”, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 78 
S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2 d 630 (1958). 
91  Pufendorf, Samuel, De jure naturae et gentium (1672), Böhling, 
Frank (Hrsg.), Band 4.1 (Buch I bis IV) und Band 4.2 (Buch V 
bis VIII) (1998), II, Kap. 1, § 5; Wesel, Uwe, Geschichte des 
Rechts. Von den Frühformen bis zur Gegenwart, 3. Aufl. 
(2006), 373.
92  See for “social holism” Pettit, Philip, Defining and Defending 
Social Holism, in: Pettit, Philip (Ed.), Rules, Reasons and 
Norms, Selected Essays (2002), p. 117, p. 120 (roots to the 
“invention of language to the establishment of society”, in the 
sense of Rousseau and to the “ideas of the community” in the 
sense of the “Volksgeist” of Hegel).  
93  Husserl, Edmund, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte 
(1874), 124 (intentional inexistence of psychic phenomens: “In 
der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in dem Urteile ist etwas 
anerkannt oder verworfen, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hasse 
gehasst, in dem Begehren begehrt usw. Diese intentionale 
Inexistenz ist den psychischen Phänomenen ausschließlich 
eigentümlich. Kein physisches Phänomen zeigt etwas 
Ähnliches.”). 
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subsystems organizing and educating themselves, provides a 
similar kind of approach. Ultimately, the world of creative 
subsystems is part of a one cosmic system of self creation 
(autopoiesis).94
This background leads to a kind of collectivism. The rule of 
law would not be dominated by individual rights, but by 
individual duties. The secular western civil law would be 
transformed to a kind of religious public law. But we have to 
keep in mind, even the Western rule of law is a kind of Holy 
Ideal for us, we are submitting us to under blindly. And, each 
form of a universal or global thinking, including the human 
rights, tends to a holistic thinking and feeling. It is build 
upon a “We-group”.  
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Altogether, our language indicates that we humans are able 
to switch between these approaches. In reality, we mix them 
up. But mostly, there is one leading Idea. In the Western 
cultures, it is individualism, not collectivism. In law it is the 
Rule of rights, not the Rule of duties. Therefore we have to 
right a wrong, not to re-implement collective duties. 
113 
D. Second Thesis: Freedom as “status communicativus” 
In my opinion, the real freedom men have is the freedom to 
switch between existing groups, developing new groups and 
a creating even a personal network. This freedom is the non-
fictional “status communicativus”.  
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94  Maturana, Humberto R. / Valera, Francisco, Autopoesis and 
Cognition – The Realization of the Living (1980), p. 148; 
Luhmann, Niklas, Rechtssoziologie, 3. Aufl. (Doppelband) 
(1987), 354 (“selbstreferentiellen (allein auf sich selbst 
bezogenen und sich dadurch rückkoppelnd verändernden und 
wachsenden) Systeme”). For his socio-biological approach the 
structures of human communication are similar to the 
interaction in and between: molecules, cells, nerves and 
impulses. 
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It settled on the middle. The real “status communicativus” 
combines of the “status naturalis” and the “status civilis”. At 
least, if the “status civilis” means being member of a special 
state, the Leviathan. Even it consists of complex “organs” 
and “cells” which are operating in a Western democratic 
state openly in and as network system.95 But the state never 
was a real body. It is and was simply a metaphor. Men are 
able to leave their old clans and their modern state to build 
up similar new collective units. The history of the United 
States demonstrates this human capability. 
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Therefore, men do not switch merely communicating by 
using their language, i. e. spiritually. He or she can chose 
changing their peer groups “emotionally” and of course 
“bodily” by walking away and joining other neighbors. But, 
everywhere and with everybody we are capable of creating a 
new “community by “communicating”.  
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However, any existent community is a kind of social or 
collective human “being” developing its own identity and 
trying to limit the freedom of their member by a special 
culture. As always, there is a kind of check and balance. 
Changing groups of an adult individual person is limited. He 
or she is a member of an ethical and ethnical “We-group”. 
Socialization is binding us. It is a spiritual one and an 
emotional one.  
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In short, language and rites, family and friends are a strong 
part of our own identity. We have to re-harmonize our 
personal identity with each changing of groups. Partly, we 
are used to accepting special social and private roles and 
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95  Castell, Manuel, Materials, for an Exploratory Theory of the 
Network Society, British Journal of Sociologie 51 (2000), p. 14 
(“The state in the information age is a network state, a state 
made out of a complex web of power-sharing, and negotiated 
decision-making between international, multinational, national, 
regional, local and non-governmental political institutions”.). In 
my opinion, each old clan, each kingdom and each state is in 
light of politics operating with permanent changing “networks” 
of individuals, who are socialized by a system of social roles. 
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rites. We are voters, drivers, tenants or we are best friends, 
brothers or sisters. But in extreme cases, we have to change 
our identity itself. The death and loss of a “partner” indicates 
this kind dilemma. Therefore, coping with death is a spiritual 
and an emotional problem for each person and for each 
human society.  
And, if the death is deliberately caused, there is a person we 
could react to. We could say, he acts unjustly and exhibits a 
warlike “status naturalis”. Therefore, he has 
“excommunicated” himself from the “status civilis” That 
would be the argument of Locke96. But that is not part of 
reality. Typically, even a murderer wants to remain a part of 
the society. But, the “We-group”97 could excommunicate 
him.  
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The “We-group” could develop another kind of reaction 
abiding by their national constitution and the humans rights. 
Colonial deportations are no longer feasible, since the 
criminal could retaliate by joining a group of peers or 
creating a new one. Locke mentions and fears these kind 
subgroups. They were not all Robin Hoods. Incarceration is 
the typical contemporary reaction. This method is similar to 
the medieval way of excluding peer members of nobility 
from political activity by forcing them into cloisters and 
castles. The chance of regaining freedom is part of this 
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96  Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Government (1690), in: 
Two Treatises of Government, Laslett, Peter (1988), §§ 19, p. 
181, p. 183. Ashcraft, Richard, Locke’s State of Nature: 
Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?, American Political Science 
Review 62 (1968), pp. 902, 904. In German: Hüning, Dieter, 
Naturzustand, natürliche Strafgewalt und Staat bei John Locke, 
in: Peters, Martin / Schröder, Peter (Hrsg.), 
Souveränitätskonzeptionen. Beiträge zur Analyse politischer 
Ordnungsvorstellungen im 17. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (2001), 
107. 
97  “Group thinking” in general, for example: Schafer, Mark / 
Crichlow, Scott, Antecedents of groupthink: a quantitative 
study, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40 (3) (1996), 
pp. 415-435. 
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system, and satisfies their noble families and their network 
of friends. Today nobility of a ruling political class is 
evolved into both, into dignity of every human being and 
into democracy.  
At least every adult is such a communicating being, and 
therefore a political human animal. To add is, insofar he or 
she can “move” and “exclude” him/her-self, and her or she is 
free in reality. The thread to go is a strong bargain chip. But 
even incarcerated slaves were able to communicate and to 
cooperate within their subcultures. Their rebellions and riots 
were real threats, too. This real political power of their 
groups was to be balanced by wide spread subcultures of 
guardians, administrators, even by churches etc.  
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Insofar the – formal – “status communicativus” is a mighty 
element of Freedom. Simplified, it means that every speaker 
(i. e. person) is permanently changing between equal 
partners and solidary We-groups. And more, on the next 
level the language evolves from the speaker and it creates a 
great “metahuman” culture that combines a lot of 
generations and foreign influences. In form of semi-manifest 
symbols the ideas behind the words seem – partly – to be 
freed from their wise authors. Every educated or socialized 
adult communicator gets typically a broad kind of spiritual 
heritage to work with. Critically internalized at least by 
young persons, this intellectual property helps creating in 
each speaker a kind of “personal sovereignty”.  
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Being able to cope personally with cultural wisdom or 
knowledge, the more the better is – substantially – a mighty 
element of Freedom. And every human communicator has an 
intellect. Shared wisdom is what still keeps us saying “homo 
sapiens”.  
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But in (Western) languages and even in Democracy, absolute 
Freedom means the loneliness and the “status naturalis”. For 
democracy we have to add, in order to civilize mere 
Freedom, the two elements of Equity (of Peers) and 
Solidarity (of caring We-groups).  
124 
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E. A Conclusion by Anthropology 
In summary, the cultural background indicates a lot. At first 
it might show mainly the social or the collective part 
respectively. But “Freedom” is part of the idea of a “person” 
that has the ability to communicate, to decide and to act. In 
short, it is the model of a reasonable human being that 
develops and fosters with his peers a “common sense” and 
that feels be cared by a kind of family.  
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126 In light of anthropology, if there is communication to 
maintain cooperation between living beings at all – or 
between whole collective subsystems, etc. –, there is at last a 
kind of individuality. And if there is communication on the 
level of (at least Western) Human languages they include the 
cultural core of freedom, the “persons”. But it is not only one 
“person”; languages offer a lot of persons – roles and rites – 
and human beings are able to switch between them.  
Anthropology might underline that “peers” are meant in the 
sense of a genetic group of brothers and sisters (Fraternity). 
And we-groups and their memberships are built on the 
model of family. Regarding Freedom, parents have 
connections to two families or within a tribe to their own 
parents or mentors etc. Their children have another kind of 
family, created by two parental family branches etc.  
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The plurality of peer-persons and of We-groups indicates in 
each society, in small tribes as well as in large nations, the 
existence and, by the way, in democracies the real amount of 
personal political freedom of “free association”. In light of 




IV. Part 3: Psychology 
A. Introduction 
No doubt, the rational mainstream of the Western democratic 
cultures emphasizes the intellectual form of humanism over 
the emotional side of humanity. And the results of biology 
seem to be a strange world, at least far from enlightenment 
and human common sense. But obviously, to act inhumane is 
a human ability, too, and every acting person should try to 
cope with both worlds. 
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In reality, the focus has to be widened. To be regarded is a 
kind of dark side of humane beings. We all are at least bound 
by two strong conditions, which are the biological basics, 
and by a sophisticated psychological structure that combines 
and balances basic survival and emotional needs with acts 
and ethics. Nevertheless, we are able to overrule the 
biological part. A rational sacrifice of life or even risking our 
lives is possible, but not typical. 
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Psyche plays a dominant role in our day to day life. It leads 
us by motivation. Yet as counterpart to the humane 
enlightenment by “reason”, the human “soul” seems to 
gravitate towards the darkness. We are motivated by at least 
half blind emotions. In reality, intelligence works together 
with emotion,98 maybe less so in science, but at least in so 
far as decisions making process. 
131 
                                           
98  Piaget, Jean, Intelligence and affectivity. Their relationship 
during child development, in: Brown, T. A. / Kaegi, C. F. 
(Eds.), Annual reviews monograph. University of California 
(1981), p. 15; Ciompi, Luciano, Zur Integration von Fühlen und 
Denken im Licht der “Affektlogik”. Die Psyche als ein Teil 
eines autopoietischen Systems, in: Kisker, Karl Peter / Müller, 
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A grid of four hypotheses might be contemplated more 
closely:  
132 
Firstly, both, Criminality of a person and punishment by the 
society could be strongly influenced by avoiding empathy 
and by dehumanizing the perpetrator. Secondly, a collective 
ethic of Humanism could not only balance and but might 
serve to exactly meant to balance this humane feature. 
Thirdly, the ethical ability of a fair balance and solidarity 
should therefore be a part of Freedom of choice.  
Fourthly and supposed it is all working out this way, even 
the person who punishes because it is law or because it is 
demanded by justice, but does not ponder “Freedom, Equity 
and Solidarity” might partly be acting by dehumanization, 
too.  
B. Techniques of Neutralization, Matza/Sykes  
In light of democracy, what about solidarity in the kind of 
sympathy (or empathy)? 
133 
As our grammar indicates, human beings are able to alienate 
and to neutralize each other:  
134 
(1) alienated: criminals are “foes” or “out-laws” esp. in terms 
of freedom or in the “status naturalis”. 
(2) neutralized: criminals are “in-humane persons”. That 
means they are no longer human beings. Therefore, we don't 
have to show solidarity or fairness. They are merely 
“objects”, and we are the “subjects”.  
                                                                                                           
C. / Strömgren, E. (Hrsg.), Psychiatrie der Gegenwart, Band I 
(1986), 373 ff. 
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In psychology, there are “techniques of neutralization”. 
These “techniques of neutralization” are originally taken 
from the theory of delinquency by Sykes/Matza, avoiding the 
social approach of subcultures. These techniques of 
neutralization are usable before and after the act.99 They 
point out the psychological techniques of justifying harmful 
actions by personal responsibility. Others, the society, the 
fate, emergency, and – most of all – the victim provokes and 
therefore is responsible for the act etc.100 In short: a denial of 
responsibility (I couldn't help myself), a denial of injury 
(nobody got hurt), a denial of a victim (they had it coming), 
a condemnation of the accusers (what right do they have to 
criticize me?), an appeal to higher loyalties (I did it for 
someone else).  
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99  Sykes, Gresham M. / Matza, David, Techniques of 
Neutralisation: A theory of delinquency, American 
Sociological Review (1957), pp. 664. See the supplement by: 
Thurmann, Quints C., Deviance and the neutralization of moral 
commitment – An emperical analysis, in: Deviant Behavior 
(1984), pp. 291, p. 292. Discussed by: Maruna, Shadd / Copes, 
Heith, What have we learned in five decades of neutralization?, 
in: Crime and Justice (2005), pp. 221; Fritsche, Immo, 
Predicting deviant behavior by neutralization: Myths and 
findings, in: Deviant Behaviour (2005), p. 486; Winkel, Frans, 
W., Criminal Behavior and the Pre-Victimization Process, in: 
Advances in Psychology and Law (1997), p. 65; Ball, Richard 
A. / Lilly, Robert, J., Juvenile delinquency in urban Country, 
in: Criminology (1971), p. 69. 
100  See: Snyder, Charles R. / Higgins, Raymond L. / Stucky, Rita 
J., Excuses, Masquerades in Search of Grace (1983), p. 129. As 
a technique to better circumvent punishment (Itoi, Ritsu / 
Ohbuchi, Ken-Ichi / Fukuno, Mitsuseru, A cross-cultural study 
of preference of accounts: Relationship closeness, harm 
severity, and motives of account-making, Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology (1996), pp. 913, p. 915). As a human ability 
to avoid conflicts by negating them: Cody, Michael L. / 
McLaughlin, Margaret L., Interpersonal Accounting, in: 
Handbook of language and social psychology (1990), p. 227; 
Schönbach, Peter, Account Episodes: The management or 
escalation of conflict (1990), p. 23. 
 68 
And of course, every “We-groups”, that consists of human 
beings, clans, tribes, gangs, communities or states, act in the 
same way. 
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In the end, neutralizing means separating the act form the 
actor. Therefore the actor, an individual or an organization, 
neutralizes himself or itself. Regarding individual persons 
Matza states that people use neutralization “to drift in and 
out” of conventional behavior, taking a temporary break 
from moral restraints. This approach matches the model of 
freedom switching from and between the “We-groups”.  
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And today there is no reason not to combine this approach 
with the theory of subculture, as well. Special “We-group” 
thinking could, for instance be fostered by abiding by the old 
rules of autocratic warlords. For closed gang-like core 
groups of offenders are proved by Topalli.101 A newly 
published study shows the “interplay of personal and social 
identities”.102  
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101  Topalli, Volkan, The Seductive Nature of Autotelic Crime: 
How Neutralization Theory Serves as a Boundary Condition for 
Understanding Hardcore Street Offending, Sociological Inquiry 
(2006), Vol. 76, Iss 4, pp. 475.  
102  Swann Jr. / William B. / Gómez, Ángel / Seyle, D. Conor / 
Morales, J. Francisco / Huici, Carmen, Identity fusion: The 
interplay of personal and social identities in extreme group 
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 
96 (5) (2009), pp. 995-1011 (part of the abstract: “When people 
become fused with a group, their personal and social identities 
become functionally equivalent. Two hypotheses follow from 
this proposition. First, activating either personal or social 
identities of fused persons should increase their willingness to 
endorse extreme behaviors on behalf of the group….. In 
particular, fused persons were more willing to fight or die for 
the group than nonfused persons, especially when their 
personal or social identities had been activated.”) Second, 
because personal as well as social identities support group-
related behaviors of fused persons, the 2 forms of identity may 
combine synergistically, fostering exceptionally high levels of 
extreme behavior.”). 
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In the background, it indicates the choice that every 
individual has more or less to make between these both kinds 
of identities. In my democratic trinity system, there is an old 
– mediating – third position, too. Every individual can 
choose the dialogical orientation, as well. There exists the 
inter-subjective role of the “empathic friend” offered by the 
model of “You and Me”. But it is important to note the 
existence of these strong social identities.  
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C. Experiments of Milgram and Zimbardo 
For the similar ability to submit to higher loyalties or within 
a hierarchy and to use torture103, let me refer to the famous 
Experiment of Milgram.104 About two thirds of the 
participants (!) were able to repeatedly torture others, by 
“obedience to authority”. Pressed by a scientist as mentors, 
although having scruples, three third of normal peoples 
could be motivated to administer electric shocks stubbornly. 
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103 Luban, David J., The War on Terrorism and the End of Human 
Rights, in: Shipka, Thomas (Ed.), Philosophy – Paradox and 
Discovery, 5th ed. (2004), p. 393; Luban, David J., Torture and 
the Professions, Criminal Justice Ethics 26 (2007), p. 59. 
Hoffmann-Holland, Klaus, Ethics and Human Rights in a 
Globalized World. An interdisciplinary Approach, in: 
Hoffmann-Holland, Klaus, Ethics and Human Rights in a 
Globalized World (2009), p. 6. 
104  Milgram, Stanley, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental 
View (1974); Blass, Thomas (Ed.), Obedience to authority: 
current perspectives on the Milgram paradigm (2000), p. 968. 
Burger, Jerry M., Replicating Milgram: Would People Still 
Obey Today?, American Psychologist 64 (2009), p. 1 – 11. 
(“We found obedience rates in 2006 only slightly lower than 
what Milgram found 45 years earlier”).  
 In German Criminology see: Eisenberg, Ulrich, Kriminologie, 
6. Aufl. (2005), § 57 Rdnr. 95, § 24 Rdnr. 1. 
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As Kelman wrote, torture is a “crime of obedience”.105 We 
might add a crime by both the authorities106 and the 
administrators.  
But why don’t we know and talk about it? It is so cruel, that 
we neutralize this ability ourselves. We democrats chose the 
same system. We think that other brutal persons and other 
criminal “We-groups” might neutralize men in that kind. 
During times of war, we ourselves may be coerced to 
justifiably act in this cruel way.107 But we “good ones” have 
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105  The torture as a “crime of obedience”, Kelman, Herbert C., The 
policy context of torture: A social.-pyschological analysis, 
International Review of the Red Cross (2005), p. 127; see as 
well Monahan, Susanne C. / Quinn, Beth A., Beyond “bad 
apples” and “weak leaders”. Toward a neo-institutional 
explanation of organized deviance, in: Theoretical Criminology 
(2006), pp. 361; as well Meyer, John W. / Rowan, Brian, 
Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and 
ceremony, American Journal of Sociology (1977), p. 340. See 
also: Tittle, Charles, Control Balance. Toward a General 
Theory of Deviance (1995), p. 135: “The central premise of the 
theory contends that the amount of control to which an 
individual is subject, relative to the amount of control he or she 
can exercise, determines the probability of dieviance occouring 
als well as the type of deviance likely to occur”. He offers a 
theory of balance between being controlled and controlling 
others. To add is of a third element that accepts the “free will”, 
that of moral “self-control”. Rethought in German Criminology 
by Müller, Ernst-Hennig, Staatsführungen als 
Tätergemeinschaften am Beispiel der 
Gefangenenmisshandlungen und Folter in Guantanamo und 
Abu Ghraib, in: Festschrift für Eisenberg zum 70. Geburtstag 
(2009), 88 ff.  
106  Crimes of authorities lead to the category of state crimes or 
political crimes, Kauzlarich, David, Political crimes of the 
State, in: Wright, Richard A. / Miller, J. Mitchell (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Criminology, Vol. 2 (2005), pp. 1230.  
107  A famous utilitarian argument is the “ticking bomb”. But the 
implied “actual danger for others” is not the normal backgrund 
of torture. It is a “latent” one. See: Luban, David, Liberalism, 
Torture and the ticking bomb, Virginia law Review, Vol. 91 
(2005), pp. 1425 as well as McCready, Douglas, When is 
torture right?, in: Studies in Christian Ethics (2007), pp. 383.  
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to have – at least in times of peace – another image of 
ourselves. But what about a collective punishment which is 
defined by reciprocity and prevention means inflicting 
something painful?108  
In fact, therefore for the “society”, but not for a free person, 
maybe it is even better to deny, than to accept and think 
about using this capability in crucial situation. And because 
it is so human, subprimate beings don’t torture each other. 
Every ritual that is officially accepted to be executed in 
extreme cases tends to be abused for gaining or maintaining 
political power. A taboo works best if it is untouchable.  
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But in Western culture that is based on rationalism and on 
science we cannot deny the apparently very normal human 
ability to “build up” a “brutal domination” by inflicting 
“pain” and by “torturing persons” any longer.  
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For a kind of wild punishment by unprofessional guardians, 
and even among a former “We-group” of students, we have 
to look at the outcome of Zimbardo's impressive Stanford 
Prison Experiment. De facto he predicted the situation in the 
ad hoc prison of Abu Ghraib is famous for.109  
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108  The “Othering” is a form of a neutalization by the state: see 
Jamieson, Ruth / Mc Evoy, Kieran, State crime by proxy and 
juridical othering, British Journal of Criminology (2005), pp. 
540, as well as “disconnecting structure from action” Monahan, 
Susanne C. / Quinn, Beth A., Theoretical Criminology (2006), 
p. 365, as well as Kelman, Herbert C., The social Context of 
Torture: Policy Process and Authority Structure: in: Crelinsten / 
Schmid (Eds.), The politics of pain (1995), pp. 31. Torture of 
special ethnical or religious (out-) groups, see: Kelman, Herbert 
C., The social Context of Torture: Policy Process and Authority 
Structure: in: Crelinsten, Ronald D. / Schmid, Alex P. (Eds.), 
The politics of pain (1995), p. 133. 
109  Zimbardo, Philip G., The Lucifer effect: Understanding how 
good people turn evil (2007), see: Chap. 15, Putting the System 
on Trail: Command Complicity. In German criminology 
Müller, Ernst-Hennig, Staatsführungen als Tätergemeinschaften 
am Beispiel der Gefangenenmisshandlungen und Folter in 
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And even the leaders of these experiments both, Milgram 
and Zimbardo, apparently subscribe to their ideals of 
science. Crucial scientific results, which both achieved, were 
their “greater goods”. To the God of science even they 
thought to have to be obedient to. But being themselves 
professional clinical psychologists, they acted unethically – 
from today point of view. They put the psychic wellbeing of 
their participants at risk. Zimbardo himself fairly pointed 
that out later on. He continued his experiment although 
noticing breakdowns of some of the students among the 
group of the humiliated prisoners.  
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There was lack of professional supervision, a neutral view 
from outside. Simplified, even both famous scientists played 
a little being gods by risking the emotional sanity of their 
participants in the name of “science”. Therefore their 
experiments indicate too, that even supposed “leaders” can 
do terrible things in the name of trustfully higher ideas.  
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D. Neutralizing in Wartimes 
The forth approach is contemplating the reality of a war, 
including ordered war crimes like My Lai.110  
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Guantanamo und Abu Ghraib, in: Festschrift für Eisenberg zum 
70. Geburtstag (2009), 90. 
110  Heinz, Wolfgang S., The Military, Torture and Human Rights: 
Experiences from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, in: 
Crelinsten, R. D. / Schmidt, A. P. (Eds.), The Politics of Pain, 
Tortures and their masters (1995), pp. 65. Kelman, Herbert C. / 
Hamilton, V. Lee, Crimes of Obedience. Toward a Social 
Psychology of Authority and Responsibility (1989), pp. 167 
(…questioning civil society about ordering of cruel war crimes 
as happened My Lai).  
110  For military training, see in German: Jäger, Herbert, 
Makrokriminalität. Studien zur Kriminologie kollektiver 
Gewalt (1989), 199; in connection with: Bandura, Albert, 
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There is a chain of command set up, so that a mere private 
seems not to carry any responsibility. Each soldier has to 
abide by the moral rules of his combating group. He wears a 
uniform, which hides his unique personality. He is even 
disguising himself. He has to take the risk of sacrificing 
himself for the honor of his group and of his country. As a 
member of a unit within a whole army, he is no longer an 
“individual”. Therefore, killings in war are the extreme form 
of “de-individualization” that man is capable of.111 An army 
in a battle is the strongest form of human conformity, and it 
is ruled by both the principle of collectivism112 and blind 
obedience.113  
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Aggression. A social learning analysis (1973), p. 239; Shatan, 
Chaim F., Militarisierte Trauer und Rachezeremoniell, in: 
Passett Peter / Modena, Emilio (Hrsg.), Krieg und Frieden aus 
psychoanalytischer Sicht (1983), 220 ff. 
111  See: Stacy, Helen, Human Rights for the 21st Century: 
Sovereignty, Civil Society, Culture (2009), Chapter 1 pp. 5 (a 
shortlist of both the amount of international conventions and of 
atrocities – the ideals and the reality of international Human 
Rights). 
112  Minow, Martha, Living Up to Rules: Holding Soldiers 
Responsible for Abusive Conduct and the Dilemma of the 
Superior Orders Defence, McGill Law Review, Vol. 52 No. 1 
(2007), (from the abstract: “… Proposed strategies real 
prospects for preventing atrocities by soldiers depend on 
changing the organizational design and resources surrounding 
the soldier and specifying new obligations for those in 
command.”). 
113  And how should Western law systems cope pragmatically with 
desertion, etc.?, see: Aviram, Hadar, Discourse of 
Disobedience: Law, Political Philosophy, and Trials of 
Conscientious Objectors, UC Berkeley Public Law Research 
Paper No. 728743 (2005), (Regarding Israel: “… while the 
court seeks to eventually preserve the ethos of military service 
and to discourage ideological dissent, it also strives to maintain 
legitimacy for its decisions under heavy media coverage, 
civilian scrutiny and political unrest. Therefore, it allows the 
objectors to bring up extra-legal, political, biographical and 
philosophical issues, and awards them exceeding procedural 
flexibility. The eventual verdicts, however, reflect the 
doctrinal-legal tendency to reduce complex personalities and 
 74 
Similarly, soldiers could, in combat, act best by neutralizing 
the enemy, too. The enemy becomes an “object” or an 
aggressive subhuman “animal”.  
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E. From Neutralization to Dehumanization 
Back to peace and in light of the human rights such a form of 
“de-individualization” could be called “de-humanization”. 
But wait, we probably cannot avoid acting like this. 
Therefore, we have to realize, first and afterwards must cope 
with this cruel human capability of “humiliating” other 
persons, even, by torturing them or kill them, at least in 
wartimes. In light of the Milgram Experiment only the “one 
third” of us is some apparently strong enough to deny 
conformity. 
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Amplified, each kind of “neutralization” could be considered 
as a way of avoiding personal responsibility. But, 
responsibility is the other side of the medal called freedom, 
and it is the condition for democracy.  
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In short – and in light of “democracy and of language” – the 
approach of neutralization probably allows some statements. 
As it is mostly the case in liberal arts it is a kind of transfer 
from empirical science to the word of culture. Therefore 
these statements are built as well on the expectation, that 
they are somehow reasonable by themselves. 
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The first special aspect is: 153 
                                                                                                           
situations into monolithic, mutually-exclusive categories, to 
facilitate a workable classification of the offenders for 
normative purposes.”). Accepting “extra legal” aspects 
indicates a kind of pre-law mediation between a Western law 
system based on personal freedom and a kind of warlike 
situation asking for personal sacrifices to the “We-group”. 
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The perpetrator acts by “dehumanizing his victim”, and by 
“dehumanizing himself”, too. The victim is a target, and he 
is simply a tool of his free ego. Please remember Locke's 
statement “…no mattering what becomes of any 
substance…”  
For a democrat, “to be human” means: not only to act freely, 
but also to act fairly and compassionately. Democrats have 
to weigh their whole secular trinity: “liberty, justice and 
solidarity”. But the criminal apparently does not do this. He 
acts in light of the credo of democracy only “freely” (by 
making use of his “liberty”). He did not ascribe to the ideals 
of democracy. He regresses into a kind of “status naturalis”. 
He violates the human rights. At least, therefore he 
dehumanizes the personality of his victim. Even the society 
has a kind of collective personality which could be harmed. 
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The second special aspect is 155 
We, the good ones “dehumanize” ourselves as well: 
• visibly, by wearing uniforms (soldiers, police) and robes 
(judges), 
• by submitting ourselves to “holy hierarchies” with 
absolute powers: the elected “commander in chief”, the 
“legal system”, the “common sense of justice”, etc.,  
• by celebrating a “holy ritual” in court,  
• by handing the whole responsibility “back to the 
criminal”,  
• by the argument that he knew the price he would have to 
pay, 
• by regarding a person as a mere suspect, 
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so we can “prosecute” and “pursue” him like hunters a prey, 
etc. 
Therefore we mighty democrats need not to take part in the 
personal burden of punishing a peer. We are innocents and 
we “wash our hands of it”. 
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Although even the “fair and reasonable” decisions to punish 
murderers, remain our “decisions” because in a democracy, 
we are the lawmakers. We regard ourselves as “autonomous 
persons”.  
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And in the end, we neutralize this personal capability itself, 
too. We are not responsible individuals any longer, we are 
“de-individualized”. A “We-group” thinking and feeling 
rules us. We argue with “common sense”. Our punishment is 
reasonable, it is fair, and it is following preventions. We are 
subject to higher reasons.  
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We do not want to know about the range of our freedom. 
But, we all know there are a lot of cases, that are 
undiscovered or which we put into a register but can’t try. 
Justice and Equity are high ideals114, not facts. Prosecuting 
in reality is a kind of selective justice. And using taxpayers’ 
money to enforce the rule of law is a political act. Maybe we 
are not that interested in scrutinizing every doubtful death 
inside hospitals, prisons and inside army camps or deaths 
involving illegals or the homeless. Maybe, only a third or 
even a fifth of the cases of murder or manslaughter are 
discovered and filed. Finally, we could decide to give the 
criminal a second chance after a while. We don’t because of 
the mass of criminality. But that phenomenon is not part of 
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114  For Egalitaranism see Parfit, Derek, Equality and Priority, in: 
Mason, Andrew (Ed.), Ideals of Equality (1998), pp. 1. 
Critically to “the presumtion in favor of equality”: Michel, 
Heiner, Kein Vorrang für Gleichheit, Archives for Philosophy 
of Law and Social Philosophy (2009), p. 385. My position is 
that in Western democracies there is at least a trinity of three 
values, but in a modest ranking: “Freedom, Equity and 
Solidarity”.  
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the guilt of the single criminal person. His contribution is 
very small. As Bloch says, if it is a fault of society, society 
should be incapacitated, at least insofar.115 By the way, it 
should be added that society tends to punish itself already by 
scarifying an asset, even a marginalized member, them they 
got.  
We are neutralizing that whole fact, too. In light of sociology 
Popitz coined that fact as “the veil of not knowing” 
(“Schleier der Unwissenheit”).116
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That means, actually, we are “all” able to at least circumvent 
our personal part of responsibility and therefore to 
“dehumanize” ourselves as well as others.  
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And we do it with much fewer scruples, if it is collectively 
done in the name of higher “justice” and amplified as a kind 
of catharsis.117  
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And vice versa, the same kind of “belief” rules closed 
subcultures of offenders. As Topalli discovered, members of 
closed groups even enjoy their criminal acts. They glorify 
themselves for being an elite “out-group”. 
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115  Bloch, Ernst, Naturrecht und Menschenwürde, 2. Aufl. (1990), 
296; Herzog, Felix, Prävention des Unrechts oder 
Manifestation des Rechts. Bausteine zur Überwindung des 
heteronom-präventiven Denkens der Straftheorie der Moderne 
(1987), 30 ff. 
116  Popitz, Heinrich, Über die Präventivwirkung des Nichtwissens. 
Dunkelziffer, Norm und Strafe (1968); Rawls, John, Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement (2001), p. 97 (“veil of ignorance”). 
117  In light of Psychology: Murray, J. / Feshbach, S., Let´s not 
throw the baby out with the bathwater: The catharsis hypothesis 
revisited, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 46 
(1978), pp. 462. In German: Schneider, Klaus / Schmalt, Hans-
Dieter, Motivation, 3. Aufl. (2000), 220. 
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F. Conformity and Collective Ethics  
But the third aspect is: This approach of submitting blindly is 
necessary because it provides the needed conformity of a 
“We-group thinking”.118 It is “the need to belong”119 that 
forms homely societies. And, on the other hand, there is the 
“feeling of empathy”. It is so strong that we need these kinds 
of techniques of neutralization. Therefore there must be a 
balance between responsibility and loyalty. The background 
is the old dualism of “individual” and “society”.  
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The fourth hypothesis and the simple answer are, to balance 
both: we have to choose “ethics” or “rules of behavior”. 
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If we as individuals cannot avoid being such “social person” 
submitting to common ideals as for instance, to “common 
sense”, the two important questions are:  
166 
Which kind of “collective ethics” do we subscribe to?  
What are the “special ethics” that our leaders subscribe to?  
There are at least two kinds of help for democrats. Firstly, 
they can choose the “Me as You” thinking as a bridge from 
the free “Me” role to a blindly loyal “We”-model. Secondly, 
the individual could try changing the gravity of their society 
insofar to a more democratic one that his mainstream culture 
switches from abiding by a “shame system” (more) to 
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118  Baron, Robert S., So Right It is Wrong: Groupthink and the 
Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group Decision Making, in: 
Zanna, Mark P. (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology, Vol. 37 (2005), pp. 219-253. 
119  Baumeister, Roy F. / Leary, Mark R., The need to belong: 
Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human 
motivation, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 117 (1995), pp. 497-
529. 
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accepting a self conscious “collective guilt” system.120 But if 
a violation of a human being is commonly or by the 
dominating group accepted and justified there seems to kind 
of “collective guilt”121. Even a Holocaust seems to be only a 
question of a social consensus. Neutralization takes the 
responsibility even for torture. But, in a democratic society 
there ought to be the “collective guilt”, too, that derives at 
least from of being the “collective lord” of the decision over 
executing the accepted rules or grant “grace” in this special 
case.  
G. Third thesis: “Personal Democratic Identity”  
First, therefore, we need “collective ethics in the sense of 
democracy”, but second, and that is my third thesis, we have 
to transfer the “credo of democracy” into our “free self”, as 
well: 
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• I am proud to be “free” in my decision, as an adult.122 
• I am proud to be “fair”, because the other is like me. 
                                           
120  For the democratic aspect of “collective guilt” see: Branscombe 
Nyla R. / Wohl, Michael J. A.; Branscombe, Nyla R., 
Remembering historical victimization: Collective guilt for 
current ingroup transgressions, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, Vol 94 (6) (2008), pp. 988-1006. 
121  For the democratic aspect of “collective guilt” see: Branscombe 
Nyla R. / Wohl, Michael J. A., Branscombe, Nyla R., 
Remembering historical victimization: Collective guilt for 
current ingroup transgressions, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, Vol 94 (6) (2008), pp. 988-1006. 
122  In light psychology as moral evolution of a human being: 
Marsh, Ian / Melville, Gaynor / Morgan, Keith / Norville, 
Garrett / Walkington, Zoe, Theories of crime (2006), p.77. 
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• I am proud to be “solidary” with every human being, 
because humanity is the highest ideal on Earth. 
And, being proud is an aspect of our “personal identity”.  
So we can fight using the tool of a “moral culture” and try 
limiting our personal and collective capability to 
dehumanize.  
And each culture featuring collectivism could act “vice 
versa” by developing a responsibility of the “We-group” and 
its leaders and a collective morality of this “We-group”. 
Instead of, for instance individual “guilt” that kind of society 
is built on collective “shame”. This feature is part of a strong 
collective identity. But of course, acting from experience 
based on one’s education cannot be neglected. We all believe 
in education by the right role models. The fact of violence 
and the manner of its social acceptance is important. At least, 
an experiment shows that persons feeling acute pain tend to 
inflict pain as punishment, even though they know this 
punishment would not do any good, but only harm others.123 
And inflicting some kind of pain is part of the Western 
understanding of punishment, too.124 It is the consequence of 
the principle of reciprocity. 
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Of course, we humans are switching between both, being an 
individual and being a member of a group. We switch by 
                                           
123  Berkowitz, Leonhard, On the formation and regulation of anger 
and aggression. A cognitiv-neoassociationistic analysis, 
American Psychologist 45 (1990), pp. 494; Berkowitz, 
Leonhard / Monteith, M. / Kruglanski, A. / Blair, C., The 
Influence of Physical Discomfort on Experienced Anger and 
Anger-related Ideas, Judgements and Memories (1990); 
Schneider, Klaus / Schmalt, Hans-Dieter, Motivation, 3. Aufl. 
(2000), 205. 
124  Kleinig, John, The Hardness of Hard Treatment, in: Ashworth, 
Andrew / Wasik, Martin (Eds.), The Fundamentals of 
Sentencing Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1998), pp. 273, 
275; Jung, Heike, Was ist Strafe? (2002), 16; Jakobs, Günther, 
Staatliche Strafe. Bedeutung und Zweck (2004), 26 ff. 
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using grammar with words or by simple acting in favor of or 
against a member of our national group or even by 
immigrating into another national culture. But, our Western 
democracy is a decision for the rule of individualism. 
Therefore both, the more empirical “personal identity” and 
the ethic of “autonomy” dominate the Western societies. 
That we do know. But the problem is that we apparently 
cannot help neutralizing the kind of personal responsibility. 
If democracy means “Liberty, Equity and Solidarity” and is 
built upon “Freedom”, we cannot hide behind “Equity” or 
justice or argue simply with “Solidarity” as a “must” because 
of that feeling called empathy. We have to be aware of all 
three parts of the trinity, and most of all of freedom. It is a 
call for freedom, rationalism or for personal transparency to 
fight personal corruption. 
170 
Accepting individual responsibility for the incarceration of 
another human being is hard to bear. But the price we 
receive is high as well. It is Pride, lordship and dignity of 
being a “democratic actor”. Our ethics and social rituals 
should internalize this common burden.125
171 
Therefore, hopefully for this part on the mostly dark side of 
humane behavior, the four hypotheses could be illustrated by 
some reasons (rationales), at least. 
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125  The approach for internalization could be done by law, similar 
as vice versa for crimes, see: Gibbs, Jack P., Crime, 
Punishment, Deterrence (1975), p. 517: “(…) one could argue 
that the internalization of norms operates to check criminality 
independently of legal reactions. But this argument assumes 
that legal reactions do not generate or reinforce social 
condemnation. If they do, then internalization of norms may be 
furthered by punitive reactions”. Andenaes, Johannes, General 
Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy Implications, The 
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 66 (1975), p. 36: 
“Punishment is a means of expressing social disapproval. In 
this way the criminal law and its enforcement supplement and 
enhance the moral influence acquired through education and 
other non-legal processes”. 
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V. Part 4: Punishment 
A. Three Kinds of Ethics and Cruelties of Punishment  
For a closer focus on the issue of punishment, let us start out 
by considering jurisprudence.  
173 
In theory, each “We-society”, small or large, has to decide 
between – at least three – leading ideals of punishment. It 
could develop a national kind of a system of solidarity 
(fraternity) or a system of fairness or of freedom.  
174 
(1) System of “solidarity” culture. It is a “we-punishment” 
(in-group). This society would prefer on one hand a model of 
social help. It looks out to minimize pain out of an internal 
sympathy. On the other hand, there would be a tendency to 
hierarchy by favoring draconic126 deterrence. The techniques 
are addressing the community with symbolic acts, sacrificing 
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126  Lyons, Lewis, The History of Punishment. Judicial Penalties 
from Ancient Times to Present Day (2003), p. 56: “The usual 
justification for strict penal regimes is deterrence, although the 
evidence shows, more often that not stricter penalties do not 
reduce crime. In ancient Athens, Draco imposed the death 
penalty for virtually every crime. Rather than deterring crime, 
Draco’s harsh legal code provoked civil unrest and eventually 
had to be repeated. The true motives for imposing stricter penal 
regimes are political; executions may or may not deter potential 
criminals, but they do demonstrate that the government is 
‘tough on crime’. … One penalty was assigned to almost all 
transgressions, namely death, so that even those convicted of 
idleness were put to death, and those who stole salad or fruit 
received the same punishment as those who committed 
sacrilege or murder. Therefore Demades, in later times, made a 
hit when he said that Draco’s laws were written not with ink, 
but blood. And Draco himself, they say, being asked why he 
made death penalty for most offences, replied that in his 
opinion the lesser ones deserved it, and for the greater ones no 
heavier penalty could be found”. 
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human beings exemplarily or even innocent pawns as 
scapegoats. The goal is to maintain the society by pressure, 
including repression. 
Societies idealizing solidarity tend to held tribunals like 
public plays on stage, too. Publicity in every kind is part of 
social Communication; it is an expression of membership 
and of democratic participation as well.  
The Western ideal of universal humanity uses the same 
approach by interpreting mankind as the global clan or a 
holy meta-group. By the way, this ideal works only by 
excluding nature as the mere environment from humans. 
And this group-thinking stems obviously from the three 
Book religions, believing in one God with a personal 
relationship to all humans.  
(2) System of “Fairness”. It is a “They-punishment” (out of 
group, but neighbors). A nation built mainly on fairness 
would be led by the ideal of business like strict reciprocity. 
But there is a strong tendency to justify pain. Retaliation 
means in history, less abstract and in medieval forms of case 
law systems inflicting the same kind of pain to the criminal 
offender, “an eye for an eye.” Combined with deterrence it 
justifies dismembering thieves etc. too. But on the bright 
side it is the old ideal of a kind of natural order of a “holy 
spirit”, including the principle of harmony as in the cultural 
approach of “yin and yang”.  
176 
(3) System of “Freedom”. Regarding punishment it is an “it-
punishment” (“neutralizing criminals into objects”). This 
culture prefers incapacitating criminals because they are wild 
and dangerous. What it means is a combination of both, a 
brutal, tyrannical “human zoo” being satisfied is inflicting 
pain and a reasonable scientific one, especially one being 
satisfied by a utilitarian “behavioral treatment”. 
177 
This system is ruled only by freedom, and at least based on 
the old “status naturalis”, if not openly returning to it. The 
positive way means favoring the creative pursuit of 
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individual happiness and giving the other freely what is “his” 
(suum cuique). The dark Machiavellian side bans 
metaphysical ethics or the emotions of sympathy. It is 
similar to a hunter system remembering that hunting of game 
was a privilege for knights and kings.  
But in my opinion, these three are, if not the only secular 
ones, then at least the three existing great mainstream 
systems ruling punishment.  
And more, vice versa, these three approaches define crime as 
well. The criminal person harms either “Solidarity” or he 
inflicts mainly “Fairness” or he violates most of all 
“Freedom”.  
They are based on either “collectivism” or “cooperation” and 
in “individualism”. Pure collectivism would mean a 
fundamentalism of society. Mere blind mutuality is the core 
of the socio-biological mechanics of systems. The ideal of 
strict individualism dominates the fight of the survival fittest, 
egoistic gene.  
How best to combine these three approaches “humanely”, is 
a question best answered in light of a multidisciplinary 
philosophical anthropology. But both is important, the 
ambivalent fundamental roots and the democratic art of 
combination. 
B. Realistic Democratic Punishment  
Of course, all bipolar approaches include – secretly or open 
– a kind of synthesis. 
178 
179 Each of the three systems bears not only a good side and a 
dark side. At the sideline of the two poles of good ideals and 
their evil abuse, or maybe even in a broad middle zone 
between both poles, there grows a third political and cultural 
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world. It is ruled by the pragmatism of a “common sense of 
balance”. Balancing almost blindly different subculture and 
forming them into a mainstream culture is a strong form of 
peacekeeping127 and this “mediation” has to be done as well 
(or at least). This thinking is backed up mainly by a kind of 
semi-religious civil consensus as a great value of its own. It 
is the synthesis of a cultivated, balancing social system.  
In light of acceptance, the three pairs of reason for 
punishment are  
180 
• social help and deterrence based on Solidarity, 
• ritual fairness and retribution grounded on Equity, 
• scientific utilitarianism and free will two kinds of 
Freedom, 
Western Jurisprudence combines these approaches in at least 
two ways. Conservative persons argue with “deterrence and 
retribution”. The progressive ones prefer “prevention” by 
social help, before and after the criminal act and “fairness” 
by providing help for the victims. The balance of both 
perspectives is to be called a nationally cultivated culture of 
punishment. 
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127 For a global world: Sandholtz, Wayne, Humanitarian 
Intervention – Global Enforcement of Human Rights?, in: 
Brysk, Alison (Ed.), Globalization and Human Rights (2002), 
p. 201.;Hoffmann-Holland, Klaus, Ethics and Human Rights in 
a Globalized World. An interdisciplinary Approach, in: 
Hoffmann-Holland, Klaus, Ethics and Human Rights in a 
Globalized World (2009), p. 1 (International Humanitarian law 
is closely linked to human rights law). 
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“Deterrence and retribution” are well known rational 
arguments for a “democratic” punishment128, culminating in 
the United States by being used for rectifying or fighting the 
death penalty.129 Their emotional basis could be described 
with the duality of “sympathy and satisfaction”. 
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128  As a form of rational choice: McKenzie Richard B. / Tullock, 
Gordon, The New World of Economics – Explorations into 
Human Experience (1975), p. 152: “The deterrence theory of 
punishment is, after all simply a special version of the general 
economic principle that raising the price of something will 
reduce the amount purchades”. 
129  Zimring, Franklin E. / Hawkins, Gordon, Deterrence. The 
Legal Threat in Crime Control (1973), p. 14: “In the capital 
punishment debate the issue is not that of absolute deterrence – 
whether the death penalty is a deterrent. It is that of marginal 
deterrence – whether it is a more effective deterrent than the 
alternative sanction of long imprisonment”. Ehrlich, Isaac, The 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and 
Death, American Economic Review (1975), pp. 379, 397: 
“What has been questioned by these scholars is the existence of 
a differential deterrent effect of the death penalty over and 
above its most common particular alternative, life 
imprisonment”.  
 Andeneas, Johannes, General Prevention Revisited: Research 
and Policy Implications, The Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology 66 (1975), p. 59: “It is unfortunate that 
discussions of general prevention have concentrated on the 
effect of capital punishment for murder (…) Even in an 
emotional crime like murder, with all its pathological elements, 
it would be untenable to claim that the magnitude of the 
punishment has no effect whatsoever. If punishment of three or 
four years imprisonment became the standard sentence for 
murder (…) this kind of crime would probably increase. In the 
long run such a reduction in penalty might also reduce the 
inhibitions against committing murder in situations where 
murder seems a tempting escape from a situation of emotional 
conflict”. Kleck, Gary, Capital Punishment, Gun Ownership 
and Homicide, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84 
(1978/79), p. 907: “Therefore it is not possible to state 
definitively that the death penalty never has exerted any 
deterrent effect in the United States, or that it never could (…) 
Contrary to the recent finding of Logan (1975) even homicide, 
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At any rate, it seems that, Western civilizations combine all 
of the three cited pairs of reasons. 
183 
C. Parallelism of three Approaches 
My own position is that the realistic democratic punishment 
is carried out by a special combination of all three 
approaches.  
184 
At first, all three are running mostly “parallel”. The reason is 
they exist in three different worlds, the world of societies, of 
ethics and of free actors, and they approach three different 
parts of a human being, “body, spirit and soul”.130  
185 
186 In light of this humane trinity of “body, spirit and soul” there 
are the following approaches. 
(1) “Physical approach”. Punishment is done freely (brutal, 
tyrannical, as well as scientific and utilitarian punishment). It 
is the incarceration. 
                                                                                                           
impulsive though it usually is, seems to be deterrable by legal 
sanctions, even though it is not specifically by the rarely 
imposed death penalty”. 
130  In light of sociology: Fritze, Lothar, Herrschaft und Konsens – 
Über Stabilitätsbedingungen von Weltanschauungsdiktaturen, 
in: Heydemann, Günther / Jesse, Eckhard (Hrsg.), 
Diktaturvergleich als Herausforderung. Theorie und Praxis 
(1998), 96 ff.  
 Popper / Eccles claiming there are three worlds in an “I”- 
person (1) the physical world, (2) world of Psyche (3) and 
Metaphysical one, Popper, Karl Raimund / Eccles, John Carew, 
The Self and its Brain (1977), pp. 61. Similar: Stephan, 
Burkhard, Biosozialstrukturen und Menschwerdung, in: 
Eichler, Bernd H. (Bearb.) / Löther, Rolf (Hrsg.), Tiersozietäten 
und Menschengesellschaften: philosophische und 
evolutionsbiologische Aspekte der Soziogenese (1988), 97 ff., 
112 ff. 
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(2) “Ethical approach”. Punishment is done fairly (for peers), 
too. This is the oral accusation and oral condemnation 
combined with the expectation to accept individual guilt. 
Even plea bargaining or deals are part of that communicative 
side of prosecution and trial. Added to this, are the 
registration and the whole social labeling an aspect of 
imprisonment. 
(3) “Empathetic approach”. Punishment is executed solidary 
(help for members). In so far as it includes the ideals of 
rehabilitation, probation, parole or personal amnesty.  
187 All three approaches are needed. But when punishment 
involves prison, the physical approach dominates the reality 
of the conviction, at least for the prisoner who is forced to 
undergo imprisonment. 
That differs from (the understanding of punishment in light 
of the law) in light of law, because all law is based on a 
normative and not an empirical approach. Therefore the 
active and the passive side are to be regarded. Law deals 
actively with consequences of existing facts or of 
expectations. Its main goal is “to right the wrong” and to 
protect freedom. Therefore it is much more grounded on 
symbolic communication than on tolerating hard facts 
passively. We democrats are seduced by the law into another 
world, forgetting the pain of facts.  
188 
Of course, there is the bridge for both, the convicted 
individual and the cultural world of right and duties. It is the 
constitution with its pragmatic and political background. But 
only for the good ones – the law, the lawyers and for the 
whole civil society – the main preference is given by 
framework of constitutions of Western nations. Nevertheless, 
let us take this point of view. The national constitutions are 
founded on the Western culture of humanism. And maybe 
there is a layer of a collective supranational transatlantic or 
Western “We-group feeling” too, which is still nourished by 
our common spiritual and moral heritage and by a 
transnational dialog.  
189 
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Even the global fundamental human rights are grounded on 
the Western Humanism and on the “universal We-group” 
feeling that all humans are reasonable persons. Some Eastern 
cultures could say that this is a mere reduction from the 
wider animistic thinking that there is a holy spirit in every 
“being” on earth. A Western “We-group” includes, by the 
way, a nearly constant Western communication. And 
universal human rights need for their cultural existence an 
enduring global communication, to build up a cultural “We-
group”. 
190 
That means “inside” of a special country or within the 
Western community or “inside” the range of the universal 
human rights there are no “out-laws” and no mere “human 
objects”.  
191 
But let us remember, every “actor” is able to quit every kind 
of “We-group”. 
192 
D. The State as an Actor 
And the powerful state is an actor, too. But it has got a 
national kind of a collective personality which is similar to 
the identity of a human being. The Leviathan is civilized by 
democracy. Although a Western democracy always includes 
the state and the civil society, both could act autonomously, 
too. Separating state and society is an approach more 
common to the US-American thinking.  
193 
But in the end, empathy is “one of the three” leading ideals 
of a civilized social system that is based on the “in group” 
thinking or the “we model” tends to focus on justice. And, 
Western law tends to lead the focus on justice. It offers very 
high ideals for the democratic law and each of its executions 
to hide behind and to neutralize personal responsibility of 
every member of a democratic society.  
194 
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This is not a call for another system, but for personal 
transparency. And the democrat who is therefore serious 
about looking for justice should ask for the common sense of 
justice.131 Jurisprudence will lead him, for instance, to 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, who both created the basics 
for the liberal natural rights of Locke, Hobbes etc. Both 
authors have never reduced justice to pure reciprocity and 
mere Equity. Justice is more than mere reciprocity. Although 
“iustitia commutative” describes the well known core of 
justice, it needs additions. Aristotle added “iustitia 
distributive” depending on rights. Romans brought in the 
social role of a person “suum cuique”. Rawls for instance 
transfers Kant’s categorical moral principle of Generalizing 
into political Jurisprudence by generalizing chances for 
everyone and providing political stability as well.132 But let 
us go back to Thomas Aquinas. He influences the later 
natural right by combining Christian theology, scientific 
scholastic thinking and natural law. He adds the legal form 
of justice, thus providing an early kind of generalization, and 
the call for charity.133  
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131 See: Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus, The Concept of Law 
(1961), pp. 181 (for an ethical core in law). And see for “legal 
Realism”: Duxburg, Neil, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 
(1995), pp. 32. 
132  Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (1993), pp. 136, 41; Klosko, 
George, Rawls’s Argument from Political Stability, Columbia 
Law Review 94 (1994), pp. 1882, 1885; Barry, Brian, John 
Rawls and the Search for Stability, Ethics 105 (1995), pp. 880.  
133  Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, in: Katholischer 
Akademikerverband (Hrsg.), Recht und Gerechtigkeit (1953), 
book II 2. 57. 1., book II 2. 58. 6.; Aristoteles, Nikomachische 
Ethik, Dirlmeier, Franz (Übrs.) (1999), 1.130 b/1131 a. Or: 
“fiat iustitia pereat mundus”. Explained I more detail and 
assimilated to solidarity as a part of the system of Human 
Rights: Montenbruck, Axel, Menschenrechtsstrafe, in: 
Strafrechtsphilosophie. Vergeltung, Strafzeit, Sündenbock, 
Menschenrechtsstrafe (1995-2009) (2009), Rdnr. 400 ff. 
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E. Consequences for Types of Punishment 
What are the exact consequences for a democratic 
punishment in light of human rights?  
196 
The main point is that sanctions are limited. They are only 
“prison or a fine”. But note that only a free person can be 
punished by imprisonment. That kind of freedom is granted 
by human rights. Life and all the values of humanity rank 
second to that kind of freedom.  
197 
Therefore, we do not any longer need public “whipping, 
branding, dismembering”. We do not even force prisoners to 
perform hard slave labor, as miners, sailors or soldiers. And 
most of the time, we do not revert to the death penalty. In 
Europe, death penalty is forbidden by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (6th Amendment). In a culture 
that is based on acting freely, we define punishment and 
crime mainly by taking away freedom. 
198 
Another aspect of humanity is based all three, on “Freedom, 
Equity and Solidarity”. Every prisoner has to have the judge 
controlled chance to regain his full “civil status”. Even a 
murderer is a human being. After maybe 20 years of 
incarceration there should be a freedom on parole, given he 
is no of a danger than anyone else. The manner of 
incarceration should be humane, as well. The German 
Federal Constitutional Court has ruled in that sense more 
than once.134 To expand of this, the reason might be that we 
don't want to be like the criminal and totally dehumanize 
others and ourselves. And we want to live in a “civilized 
country”, respected by our “peer-nations”. 
199 
                                           
134  As part of Dignity of Men: BVerfGE 109, 133 ff., 134; 
BVerfGE 45, 187 ff., 227; BVerfGE 87, 209 ff., 228; BVerfGE 
96, 375 ff., 398; BVerfGE 102, 370 ff., 389. 
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The words of the Eighth Amendment are:  200 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted”.  
A similar sentence is part of the European Convention on 
Humans Rights (Art. 3). But the juridical dilemma is, who 
defines the understanding of “cruel”, and how do we 
interpret the term “unusual”. Regarding the German Federal 
Criminal Law and concerning a life sentence for murder135 
the Judges of the German Federal Constitutional Court use a 
similar clause. It couldn’t be their task to define by 
themselves the correct ruling principle of punishment.136 
Penalties which are accepted by common sense or national 
consensus are apparently not “cruel”. Therefore each 
democratic and “matured society” has to evolve its own 
“standards of decency”137 including punishment.  
201 
This process ought to be undertaken openly and on a 
political level. A first step should be accepting that 
punishment is at least combined with, if not meant to inflict 
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135  For US-polls regarding lifelong incarceration without parole 
instead of death penalty, see: Death Penalty Information 
Center, Facts About the Death Penalty (May 1. 2008), p. 4. 
Hoffmann-Holland, Klaus, Neither Retribution nor Deterrence 
– Kriminologische Aspekte der Entscheidung des U.S. 
Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, in: Müller, Henning 
Ernst / Sander, Günther M. / Valkova, Helena (Hrsg.), 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Ulrich Eisenberg (2009), 
69, 79 ff. 
136  BVerfGE 45, 187 ff., 253 ff. 
137  “Evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society”, Trop v. Dulles, 336 U S. 86, 100-101, 78 S. 
Ct 590, 2 L Ed. 2 d 630 (1958); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U S. 
551, 561, 563 (2005). See: Hoffmann-Holland, Klaus, Neither 
Retribution nor Deterrence – Kriminologische Aspekte der 
Entscheidung des U.S. Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, 
in: Müller, Henning Ernst / Sander, Günther M. / Valkova, 
Helena (Hrsg.), Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Ulrich 
Eisenberg (2009), 69 ff., 70 f.  
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“harm”. In a democracy the executed verdict “harmed” the 
criminal a sovereign person who has harmed “others”, and 
every democrat is a real lord over lawmakers, judges and 
administrators. The next step could be recognizing that a 
long term incarceration without the permanent offer of help 
is felt as “cruel”, and that it is even meant by the punishers 
as retaliation. They have to answer the old questions about 
who they are. Underlying this model is the ancient concept 
of fighting an aggressor (from within) as in a civil war, but 
without accepting the danger of mutuality, i.e. where large 
subcultures of young and aggressive outlaws may grow 
within the society. Even if that is openly accepted, the next 
Machiavellistic question is, maybe the punishers themselves 
are secretly interested in fighting wars on crime that need 
and foster themselves as sophisticated organized and well-
equipped army of fighters and guardians. Medieval political 
systems are built on that kind of protection. Obviously, the 
secret love for free warriors and public fear of warlord 
systems create the real background for the cultural fiction of 
a “status naturalis” that leads to a social contract of the free 
persons, which the Preambles of a lot of written Western 
constitutions are reflecting. 
Therefore the simple political question is: are the punishers 
interested in a balanced Western Democracy that includes 
Humanity in form of Solidarity, or are they not?  
203 
F. “Rule of Weighing Freedom, Equity and Solidarity” 
204 But even then, we have to accept also, that we personally 
and our “We-group” are free to switch into the wild “status 
naturalis”, we are able to act “freely and fairly” and to 
exclude solidarity while still “believing” in what we are 
doing.  
These are the “free”, the “fair” and the “humane” 
consequences for punishment in Western democratic 
205 
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societies. Weighting all parts of this political trinity means 
acting as a democrat. Nevertheless, it should be noted, that 
the basic aspect of Western democracy is freedom. 
But maybe on a more basic level, the political level of great 
parties, there also has to be a balance between a liberal and a 
conservative position. In the field of social psychology a 
study138 shows two kinds of moral foundation, both a liberal 
and a conservative one, and it gives a good overview over 
five other sets of ethical approaches as well.  
206 
A “liberal person” prefers the endorsement and use of the 
first two positions. The liberal two sets are ones: (1) 
“Harm/care” and (2) “Fairness/reciprocity”.  
207 
A “conservative person” uses – equally – all five, and 
therefore the other three sets of moral intuitions as well. 
These are the sets (3) “In-group/loyalty”, (4) 
“Authority/respect”, and (5) “Purity/sanctity”  
In my opinion, if the last three sets altogether dominated the 
first two, that kind of “conservative person” would prefer the 
collectivism of in-group and the law and order structure of 
their ruling elite. As to the balance of both approaches for 
instances in two parties, the liberal and the conservative, 
even from that point of view, there are both kind of person 
needed, those who prefer to decide and act themselves the 
“free” ones, and those who abide by the system (“We-group 
thinking”) or try to harmonize the individual and the group, 
which needs at least secretly a higher ideal, like a secular 
common sense build on reason, or an ethical religion. 
On the other hand, blindly submitting even under the highest 
secular ideals ought to be punishable in itself as a crime 
against the ideal of democracy, because decisions reached in 
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138  Graham, J. / Haidt, J. / Nosek, B, Liberals and conservatives 
rely on different sets of moral foundations, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 96 (5) (2009), pp. 
1029-1046.  
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this way are acts of dehumanization. Freedom is only limited 
by freedom. That means that this fictive model of a 
sovereign person includes the ability of the free actor abiding 
by personal morality or act with self restrain.  
Again, not to at least grant “grace” – in every special case – 
is a free decision and indicates the real range of pragmatic 
freedom we democrats have. Our argument that we have to 
keep up deterrence – for others – shows the quantum of the 
convict as a mere example and his change from a subject and 
a peer to a tool (object), which we use to fight mass 
criminality. Both points, this negation and this 
rationalization, are in short the “humus”139 for our 
“collective responsibility” maybe even our “collective guilt” 
as an in-group of free democrats.  
209 
Anyhow, punishing a “ruling member” as a genuine part of 
our own “collective social body” hurts and harms the social 
body. It is and must be – consciously and intended – a kind 
of self punishment, too. That means we are sacrificing a part 
of our democratic identity as well and on the same altar of 
“freedom, equity and solidarity”. We take the freedom of a 
co-ruling democrat.  
210 
Inside of a civilized Western society there are three 
positions:  
211 
(1) to be the democrat,  
(2) to act as a partner of the local peers of democrats and  
(3) to feel proud of and support the decisions of the national 
“We-group” of democrats.  
                                           
139  To both roots of the word Humanity, which derive (1) from the 
– creative and natural – “humus”, and (2) from the – semi-
religious and normative – “humanitas”, see: Rappaport, Roy A., 
Ritual and Religion in the making of Humanity (1999), p. 406.  
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Modernizing and amplifying an old dilemma, we human 
democrats react – partly – “free” to a “free”, but inhumane 
act, although measured but – partly – reciprocally in the 
same way. Of course our intentions are better – or so at least 
our own common sense of equity meant as restoration tells 
us. But we act and we have to take our part of the 
responsibility for every democratic act. Therefore “we free 
persons” might weigh before, or weigh at least afterwards 
and correct the unfair and inhumane actions.  
That is or should be “common sense”. Combined with a 
democratic determination correcting the rare cases of abuse 
of power we cannot avoid this double rule should dominate a 
democratic society.  
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Such a kind of mainstream within a national culture is or 
would be a “We-group” of civilized, i.e. weighing “Me-
persons”. These free men are not only acting freely, but have 
built up a sophisticated super ego characterized by 
consciousness and compassion, and by internalizing the 
ideas of equity (as fairness) and solidarity (as compassion), 
as well. 
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But each democrat should be aware that each political act 
includes the choice between morality and neutralization or 
between granting humanity and dehumanizing human 
beings. Neutralization in a Western Democracy means 
Dehumanization. Punishment and crimes are both strong 
examples for – at least partly – dehumanizing a human 
being.  
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G. A Fourth and Final Three-pointed Thesis 
My final thesis consists of three points:  
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(1) The “Rule of Weighing political acts democratically” 
means harmonizing for each important individual case 
“Freedom, Equity and Solidarity”. That is the Western basis.  
215 
(2) Regarding punishment in Western societies we have to 
be aware that painful punishment by imprisonment is – 
partly – a political “free” act, which each democrat is 
responsible for. We have to feel this load on our shoulders. 
Each justified imprisonment of a fellow human being – of 
our state or a foreign country – is not only an act of fair 
“reciprocity” as a form of “equity” and not an act of 
prevention regarding others or the society as a whole, which 
both is a kind of caring “solidarity”. It is a free act, too.  
216 
(3) Highly amplified, “one third” of the inflicted pain is the 
burden we democrats should to be aware of. That is the raw 
amount of our part of responsibility. In that train of thought, 
our solace could be, but must not lead to full neutralization, 
two thirds are not. 
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VI. Epilogue: Anthropology and Ethics 
Anthropology tells us that other “primates”, and even 
chimpanzees, lack mainly the social skills of their humane 
cousins. The early ability of human beings to communicate 
with one another in a language, which always includes a 
kind of grammar, develops the human brain. Comparing the 
intelligence of children of humans with that of chimpanzees, 
this is the main difference:  
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“… regular participation in cooperative and communication 
with ontogeny leads children to construct uniquely powerful 
forms of perspectival cognitive representation”.140
219 Therefore the human kind of language makes the difference. 
Communication itself is the basis not only for cooperation 
and burden sharing. But a lot of social mammals use this 
principle of “tit for tat”. Language allows the human 
individual to live in a wider system of a lot of different 
groups. My metaphor is: Humans even separate their main 
groups similar to different species that exist together in the 
same “biotope”.141 At least today, humans live in their 
greater national territories much more unified, like a lot of 
subcultures of different species. Instead of in their “genes” 
they differ from one another in an analogue way by ethical 
and ethnical “memes”.142 Mankind has partly crossed the 
                                           
140  In testing and comparing the intelligence of offspring of 
humans and apes the intelligence of both groups differs only 
partly, especially in the social skills of young humans: Moll, 
Henrike, / Tomasello, Michael, Cooperation and human 
cognition: the Vygoskian intelligence hypothesis, The royal 
Society (2007), pp. 362. 
141  Montenbruck, Axel, Zivilisation. Staat und Mensch, Gewalt 
und Recht, Kultur und Natur (2009), Rdnr. 1020. 
142  Dawkins, Richard, The Selfish Gene (1978), pp. 191; Lumsden, 
Charles J. / Wilson, Edward O., The Promethean Fire (1983), 
pp. 120, 126, 139. Lumsden, Charles J. / Wilson, Edward O., 
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stricter limitations of genes regarding the pre-program of all 
the other complex mammals or vertebrates etc. Much more 
speculative and in light of philosophical anthropology I 
would add: by going back to the roots and by picking up that 
kind of older “social freedom through communicating”, that 
is still known in the most simple forms of bacteria, 
mushrooms and in systems of virus stems. Their pool of 
genes is part of ours as well, if we accept the model, of a 
rather strict evolution of the blue print of genes of all living 
beings since the beginning of live on.143  
Apes at least, as well as all the other mammals, are much 
more connected within their own groups than humans. Even 
chimpanzees, who might know something about brutal 
aggression, do not know about bloody revenge or about the 
human form of a group punishment. They try to resolve an 
in-group conflict in the very present moment. Apparently 
their “genes” tell them still to avoid brutality inside of their 
group. But chimps start using brutality in territorial fights 
against their neighbors. They hunt and beat members of rival 
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Genes, Mind and Culture (1981), pp. 305. Caporael, Linnda R. 
/ Brewer, Marilynn B., Reving Evolutionary Psychology: 
Biology Meets Society, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 47 (3) 
(1991), pp. 187-195, 189. 
143  In light of Biology about the thirteen steps of Evolution, written 
in our human genetic code, and on the theory of strict “blue 
prints” from the first beginning of life on, see: Duncker, Hans-
Rainer, Probleme der wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der 
komplexen Organisation von lebenden Systemen, in: Maier, 
Wolfgang/Zoglauer, Thomas (Hrsg.), Technomorphe 
Organismuskonzepte (1994), 299, 302. In light of 
anthropology: For the simple thesis of getting freedom from the 
genetic pre-program of a very complex mammal species by 
going back to the programs of much less complicated beings 
(“back to the roots”), see: Montenbruck, Axel, Zivilisation. 
Staat und Mensch, Gewalt und Recht, Kultur und Natur (2009), 
Rdnr. 731 ff. We are gaining freedom by acting partly similar 
to the creating nature itself, by using “natural sciences” and by 
knowing the “basic laws of nature”, Montenbruck, Axel, 
Zivilisation. Staat und Mensch, Gewalt und Recht, Kultur und 
Natur (2009), Rdnr. 259, 512, 1035. 
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groups and even former group members to death, but mostly 
when a single foreign individual was met by a larger group 
of aggressive males.144 Their standard living group 
comprises of up to 10 members. Greater communities, like 
herds or human tribes145 are unknown, at least to them.  
And apes and many other animals use symbolic and ritual 
actions of threat as well and groups of socials mammals 
recognize other members individually, too. But, only human 
beings are able to live in such a complicated and open 
system of different “We-groups” and only they evolved the 
genetic skill and freedom to switch between them. By the 
way, “Freedom” of a social individual is to define as the 
ability switching between groups and roles. But even their 
members are still bound to conformity within a “main 
group”, too. Insofar human beings counterbalance their 
genetic individual freedom by “solidarity”. Therefore, the 
humans have to structure their groups and especially their 
kind of conformity by themselves. They develop and foster 
their own civilization in terms of their own ethical and 
ethnical rituals and laws. And underlying this culture may be 
universal feelings toward “reciprocity” and “grace”. I would 
add, there also exists a universal feeling towards “Freedom, 
Equity and Solidarity”, and this feeling exists in even the 
smallest group of “peers”. The models are “brothers and 
sisters” or “cousins”, and these metaphors are often used 
especially to describe personal and “freely” chosen 
friendship. 
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144  See: Wangham, Richard / Dale Peterson, Demonic Males – 
Apes and the Origin of Human Violence (1996), Chap. 1 (Lost 
Paradise): aggressive small male groups (of 3-6 individuals) 
use deadly force against former members and members of other 
small groups, mainly when the victims at the moment of 
aggression are single).  
145  Ridley, Matt, The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the 
Evolution of Cooperation (1996), pp. 140 (“The tribal 
primates”).  
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Therefore, “revenge” or “punishment” – long after the act – 
and, of course, every kind of “public tribunal”, are unique 
features of homo sapiens. In this wider biological sense even 
angry revenge is simply “humane”, too. Hence, the humane 
reaction to an offence can be both a “natural” one, “wild, 
unfair and inhumane” (status naturalis) or a “civilized” 
(status civilis) one or of course something in between. At 
least after the rush of their first emotions men are able to 
think and argue about the best decision that is to be made. 
They call in an assembly. Each more formal process takes 
time for informal preparations inside of networks, needs an 
open local forum, and involves holy eternal rituals. A 
process includes third persons acting in three social roles, as 
learned “mediators”, as powerful “executors” and as 
“empathic helpers”.  
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Therefore good Democrats try balancing in each of their 
severe personal decisions “Freedom, Equity and Solidarity” 
or they choose relinquishing democracy at least in this case. 
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